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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses the first wave of HILDA in an analysis of the determinants of fertility, 
focusing in particular on the role of education. Estimating lifetime fertility from micro 
data sets is generally quite difficult since a large proportion of the sample, because of 
their age, will have incomplete fertility. The HILDA survey allows this problem to be 
addressed, however, because as well as measuring the actual number of children a person 
has, there is also information on the additional number of children a person expects to 
parent. Thus it is possible to estimate the determinants of fertility in three dimensions: the 
actual number of children a person has, the expected future number of children, and total 
intended lifetime fertility, the sum of the first two.  
 
The analysis is conducted in several stages. First, total intended lifetime fertility is 
modelled as a function of education and a host of other variables reflecting the 
opportunity costs and consumption elements of child rearing. The HILDA sample allows 
control for a host of other factors, reflecting both attitudes and values, and their roles are 
examined as well. The main result is that education lowers total lifetime fertility, 
although the strength of this relationship falls importantly with the addition of a range of 
variables, such as marital history and equivalised household income. 
 
A second set of estimations concerns the determinants of the expected future number of 
children, controlling for the number of children a person already has. The estimations 
reveal that more educated people tend to have significantly higher fertility expectations 
than others, and that the effect is non-linear. The juxtaposition of the results of the two 
approaches could be interpreted to mean that higher education per se does not lower 
people’s fertility expectation while the more educated tend to defer their fertility and may 
end up with fewer children due to some unexpected constraints such as deterioration or 
breakdown in relationship and fecundity problems at later stage. Realising these risks 
before hand along with appropriate institutional and financial supports from the 
government may help the educated people to achieve their fertility expectation.  
 
In addition to education, all fertility measures are influenced importantly by, among 
others: household income (negative for the first and positive for the second); partnering 
(positive); the significance of religion in people’s lives (positive); and values concerning 
motherhood (positive). Many different specifications were explored with the main 
conclusions being robust. It is recognised, however, that fertility decisions are likely to be 
made in combination with a host of other life-cycle issues, such as investment in 
education, and that the results of the estimations need to be qualified by this reality. 
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1. Introduction 
The trade-off between the quality and quantity of children for individuals is well 
known in economics, and it is believed to have contributed to the fertility decline in 
the developed countries in the last few decades (Becker and Lewis 1973). At the 
society level, it seems that there also exists such a trade-off in the developed world.  
As the human capital of individuals has been increasing with increasing education 
levels, population growth has been slowing down with decreasing fertility. 
Consequently the growth rate of aggregate human capital in society as a whole is not 
as fast as it would be if the population grew at a constant rate, and that has important 
implications for economic growth in the long run.   
Many developed countries including Australia have experienced a parallel increasing 
education level and decreasing fertility, and naturally the fertility decline has been 
attributed by many economists to the increased level of education, especially that of 
women. Since the education level will surely continue to increase in the future, it is 
important to know whether the negative correlation between education and fertility is 
inherent—increasing education level will inevitably lead to decreasing fertility—or 
just spurious, and how, if possible, public policy can counteract this effect.   
The explanation offered by mainstream economics theory for this concurrence is the 
increase in opportunity costs associated with child bearing and rearing for women 
with increasing education. But several points are noteworthy. First, economics 
theories do not come to any clear-cut conclusions about the negative correlation 
between schooling and fertility. Second, empirical findings are also inconclusive. 
Third, the usually observed fertility—the number of children ever had—is just 
realised fertility, which is affected by many factors other than opportunity costs, such 
as fecundity and partnering conditions. Compared with realised fertility, fertility 
expectation may be where opportunity costs present a more plausible explanation. 
However, in fact, several studies in Australia (Beggs and Chapman 1988; Chapman et 
al. 2001; Breusch and Gray 2004) find that a mother’s forgone lifetime earnings from 
child rearing have decreased markedly in the last decade or so, especially for more 
educated women.  
According to economic theory, opportunity costs will affect people’s fertility decision 
in terms of both number of children they expect to have and the timing and spacing of 
births. This paper only looks into the effects of education on fertility expectations in 
Australia. The analyses are based on the first wave of the HILDA Survey1, and two 
kinds of fertility expectations have been investigated with two types of models.  
Intended lifetime fertility is analysed with a static one-stage model; the results of 
estimation show that higher education is associated with lower intended lifetime 
fertility. However, when marital history and household income are controlled, the 
correlation becomes insignificant. The difference of education effects on fertility 
expectation between different age groups is also found to be insignificant.  
The expected extra number of children in the future is analysed with a type of 
dynamic model. Conditional on the number of children ever had and other 
experiences in the past as well as the current situation, higher education is found to be 
                                                          
1 See Watson and Wooden (2002) for overview of HILDA. For more information about the HILDA 
Survey, please refer to the website of Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research at 
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/.  
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positively correlated with fertility expectation. The conclusion is robust to various 
model specifications. Since the more educated people tend to defer their fertility and 
thus have had fewer children than less educated ones of the same age, the interaction 
terms of education and number of children ever had are also controlled in some model 
specifications. The results show that the schooling effects are more significant for 
women currently with one or two children, and after controlling for household income 
and marital status, the effects become insignificant.  
Compared with the first kind of model, the second kind of model has less serious 
endogenous problems and utilises more information. Therefore the results are seen to 
be more reliable. The correlation between education and expected number of children 
in the future is non-linear, while the more educated people tend to expect more 
children than the least educated ones, suggesting that the negative effect of education 
on fertility is not inherent and could be counteracted by appropriate policies.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section is literature 
review, followed by a description of the data and the methodology, then the results of 
estimation are reported and analysed. The last part is a brief summary and 
conclusions.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 World literature on the correlation of fertility and education 
Beginning in 1830, sustained fertility decline was reported in France, from where it 
spread to other Western countries (van de Kaa 1996). Between 1870 and 1930 the 
median decline of marital fertility in Europe was about 40 percent, and the preceding 
mortality decline is part of the reason (Lee 2003). Generally, the decline in this period 
was mainly seen as a function of progress, that included modern education, improved 
health conditions and economic development (van de Kaa 1996).  
However, the problem looms large as the trend continues. In the last few decades the 
decline has become much more dramatic, and has occured in almost all the developed 
countries. Now the Total Fertility Rates (TFRs)2 of many countries in Europe, North 
America and East Asia are well below the replacement rate3. The issues of an aging 
population are becoming more serious as fertility declines and life expectancy 
increases, causing strong social and economic pressures. So it is not surprising that 
the worldwide fertility decline has drawn the attention of demographers, sociologists, 
economists as well as historians, and many theories have been proposed to reveal the 
causes of the trend from different aspects. 
                                                          
2 The total fertility rate for any given year is the sum of age-specific fertility rates for that year. It 
represents the number of children a woman would give birth to during her lifetime if she experienced 
the current age-specific fertility rates at each age of her reproductive life. (ABS 2004a) 
3 In Europe, during the period of 1950-2000, the TFR dropped from 2.7 to 1.9 in France, from 2.2 to 
1.4 in Germany, from 2.3 to 1.2 in Italy, from 2.6 to 1.2 in Spain, from 2.2 to 1.6 in Sweden. In North 
America, during the same period it fell from 3.7 to 1.5 in Canada, from 2.2 to 1.6 in the UK, and from 
3.5 to 2.1 in the US. The decreases are especially dramatic in some Asian countries, such as Japan 
(from 2.8 to 1.3), South Korea (from 5.4 to 1.4) and Singapore (from 6.4 to 1.4). Many of the 
developing countries such as China, India and Viet Nam also have witnessed a rapid decline in fertility. 
(ABS 2003a) 
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Parallel with the declining fertility, most developed countries have witnessed 
decreasing mortality, increasing income and wealth, as well as increasing education 
and labour force participation of women. These are speculated to be the most 
important causes and have been the focus of many studies in demography, economics 
and other fields.  
 The “Demographic transition” theories of demographers emphasise the importance of 
decreasing mortality, which makes it possible for parents to have fewer children to 
achieve their ideal family size (van de Kaa 1996; Castles 2002). However, these 
theories do not explain why fertility continues to decline well below the replacement 
rate in many countries. The mainstream economic theories attribute the decline 
mainly to the increased opportunity costs of child-bearing and rearing for women with 
higher levels of education and high labour force participation (Schultz 1969; Becker 
1991). However, the early economic approaches fail to explain “why fertility 
transition has occurred in different places under rather different economic conditions, 
and why initial stage of the transition is so rapid, relative to the more gradual pace of 
economic change” (Manski and Mayshar 2002:2). Diffusion of innovation and 
preference, change in culture and incompatibility of employment and child rearing 
have been emphasised by researchers in other paradigms (Pollak and Watkins 1993).  
Though not free from criticism, the economic arguments of opportunity cost and the 
trade-off between child quality and quantity have provided logical linkages between 
increasing education levels, labour force participation and income and declining 
fertility. They have thus provided one of the most persuasive explanations for the 
worldwide fertility decline, and have been widely accepted.  
However, the economic theories in fact do not predict a clear-cut negative correlation 
between education and fertility. Although more educated women are facing higher 
opportunity costs of childbrearing, they tend to have higher wages and also tend to 
have a partner with a higher education and higher income (Becker 1991), therefore 
they can afford to have more children than less educated women (Pollak and Watkins 
1993). In theory, the total effect of increasing income on fertility is not necessarily 
positive and not necessarily negative either, depending on the elasticity of quality and 
quantity (Becker and Lewis 1973).  
In addition, more educated women tend to defer marriage and fertility4, thus some 
women may not finally achieve their desired fertility because of the limited time 
available for partnering and childbearing or for fecundity reasons. Education may 
affect family formation, female autonomy and gender equality and thus reduce 
fertility (Mason 1986; Basu 2002; Bratti 2003). Furthermore, more educated women 
may desire a smaller family, have better knowledge about contraception, and also 
experience much better child survival rates. In short, they have a higher ability to 
control their fertility and achieve their fertility objective (Rosenzweig and Schultz 
1985; Schultz 1993; Cheng and Nwachukwu 1997; Lam and Duryea 1999; Basu 2002 
and references therein). All these may contribute to the lower fertility of more 
educated women.  
Furthermore, Bhat (2002) points out a largely ignored fact, that is, owing to resource 
constraints children from large families may receive less schooling. Lam and Duryea 
(1999) also find strong effects of parental schooling on children’s schooling in Brazil. 
So the causation between fertility and education may also occur in reverse. If more 
                                                          
4  The higher education of women is also associated with a higher divorce rate (Beck 1973). 
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educated women are more likely to come from small families, and people from small 
families tend to have fewer children, then the outcome of low fertility may be due to 
other reasons such as gene and family background, and not necessarily because of 
attaining more education per se. To sum up, education effects on fertility appear to be 
very complex and can work through various different channels. Generally, the total 
effects of education cannot be derived directly from economic theory, but are issues 
that need to be explained through empirical work.  
The empirical findings on the correlation between education and fertility are mixed. 
In the economics literature a negative correlation is frequently reported (Rosenzweig 
and Schultz 1985; Easterlin 1987; Becker 1991; Sander 1992; Schultz 1993; Lam and 
Duryea 1999). However, some studies have shown evidence of a positive 
association—Bratti (2003) has listed a few, for instance, Ben-Porath (1973) and 
Danziger and Neuman (1989) for Israel, and Moffitt (1984) for the US. Some other 
papers find the correlation is not monotonic or insignificant. For instance, Bratti 
(2003) finds that the marital fertility of women with upper secondary schooling is the 
highest; the sample was restricted to married women aged between 21 and 39. 
Bloemen and Kalwij (2001) (cited in Bratti 2003) find no significant effect of an 
increase in years of schooling on the completed fertility of women in the Netherlands, 
though it causes a woman to schedule her births later. Applying the technique of time 
series analysis, Cheng and Nwachukwu (1997) show that in Taiwan, more education 
does not Granger-cause lower fertility either. In the context of developing countries, 
Jejeebhoy (1995) concludes that the effect of female schooling is highly context-
specific, varying by region, time and development stage.  
2.2 The fertility and education profile in Australia 
The mixed findings in the literature highlight the importance of the specific context of 
female education level. The fertility profile of Australia shares the basic features of 
other developed countries, but exhibits some unique characteristics too. 
1. Total fertility rate  (TFR) has been continuously decreasing for about forty years. 
Since 1961 when the TFR peaked at 3.5 babies per woman due to the “baby 
boom” after the Second World War, the TFR in Australia had been decreasing all 
the time until 2001 it reached an all-time low of 1.73 babies per woman (ABS 
2003a, 2005). 
2. The profile of age-specific fertility has changed greatly: fertility among younger 
women (especially the 20-24 age group) has declined while fertility for the older 
women has increased over the last two decades. In 2002 women aged 30-34 
experienced the highest fertility among all the age groups (ABS 2003a). 
3. Median age of parents5 has been increasing for several decades. After three-
decades of decrease, in 1971 the median age of mothers reached a low of 25.4 
years. However, since 1972 the median age of mothers has continuously 
increased. In 2003 it reached 30.5 years. The median age of all fathers increased 
from 29.9 years in 1982 to 33.3 years in 2002 too. In the meantime, the median 
age of parents having their first nuptial birth has also increased greatly. From 1982 
to 2002 the median age of mothers experiencing first nuptial birth and that of 
fathers increased from 25.5 years to 30.1 years and from 28 years to 32 years 
(ABS 2003a, 2005). 
                                                          
5 The age at which half the population is older and half is younger.  
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4. The proportion of births out of wedlock has been increasing since the 1950s and 
accelerating over the last two decades. Just after the Second World War, only 4% 
of all births were exnuptial. In 1982 this increased to 13.7%, and in 1992 the 
figure rose to 24%. By 2002 exnuptial births accounted for 31.3% of total births 
and the proportion increased further to 31.6% in 2003. In the meantime, the 
proportion of paternity-not-acknowledged births in all exnuptial births has been 
decreasing significantly from 38% in 1982 to 12% in 2002, reflecting the change 
in society’s attitude to exnuptial births (de Vaus 2002a, ABS 2003a, 2005). 
5. There has been a growing trend in lifetime childlessness of women. The lowest 
level of childlessness appeared after the Second World War. Among women born 
between 1930 and 1946 only 9% or so had not had any children, while in 1986 
about one-fifth of women were likely to remain childless. As estimated recently 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, about 24% of women currently in their 
reproductive years (15-44 years) would have no children at all (ABS 2002).   
In the literature, the declining fertility in Australia after the “baby boom” is mainly 
attributed to the following reasons: changes in social values and attitudes, especially 
the prevalence of feminism and individualism (Weston and Qu 2001; ABS 2004a); 
progress in contraceptive technology (Qu et al. 2000; de Vaus 2002b; ABS 2004a); 
institutional changes, such as the introduction of the Family Law Act 1975, which 
made divorce much easier, and the reinterpretation of the abortion law in New South 
Wales in late 1971, which gave women more freedom to control their births6 (Weston 
et al. 2001; ABS 2003a). Changes in family formation—low marriage rate, delayed 
age of marriage, high divorce rate, and instability of marriage, increasing lifetime 
childlessness, decreasing infant mortality rate and the falling average number of 
children in families have also been cited as reasons for declining fertility in Australia 
(Barnes 2001; Fisher and Charnock 2003 and references therein; ABS 2002). The 
effects of the increasing participation of women in the labour market and education 
levels, and consequently the increasing opportunity costs for women to bear and rear 
children, have also been emphasised by many scholars (for example, McDonald 
2001a & 2001b; Johnson and Kalb 2002; Castles 2002).  
In the last few decades, both the education participation rate and the achieved 
education level have increased substantially (Le and Miller 2002; ABS 2003b). 
According to ABS (2003b), from 1992 to 2002, the education participation rate of all 
aged 15-19 increased from 72.8% to 77.3%, and that of all aged 20-24 increased from 
27.1% to 37.2%. Females account for more than half of the higher education students 
all the time. In 1992, of all people aged 25-64, only 11.3% had gained a Bachelor 
degree or above, while in 2002 the proportion increased to 20.4%. Among all persons 
aged 15-64 years with post-school educational qualifications, the proportion of 
females had increased from 43.6% in 1992 to 46.8% in 2002.  
The negative correlation between fertility and schooling is very evident in Australia 
(see Figure 1 in Day and Dowrick 2004:5). However, it is hard to say which one 
comes first. For instance, Day and Dowrick (2004) suggest that the decline in fertility 
is first. As they put it, “The decline in fertility over the past few decades is linked to a 
                                                          
6 However, although the regulations of state/territories on abortion differ from each other, in general 
women’s freedom on abortion is still limited in Australia. Only in certain circumstances is abortion 
permitted by the law. For instance, in Victoria an abortion is lawful only if the woman or the doctor 
“held an honest belief on reasonable grounds that the abortion was both 'necessary' and 'proportionate.'” 
(Cica 1998) 
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concurrent strong rise in labour force participation of Australian women as well as a 
subsequent rise in average education attainment” (Day and Dowrick 2004:3, my 
emphasis).  
Thus the relationship between fertility and schooling is very complex, and it is 
impossible to draw a firm conclusion about which is the cause and which is the 
consequence. It is quite likely that they are both causes and consequences of each 
other at different stages. An important and more interesting question is that, given that 
more educated women tend to have fewer children, lower fertility leads to longer 
schooling of children, and the children with better education will have fewer children 
when they grow up, what can be expected about the fertility in the future. It seems 
certain that the education level will continue to increase. Then, will the fertility 
continue to decrease, and will it converge to a positive steady state? These are 
important theoretical issues, which are beyond the scope of this paper. The objective 
of this paper is to find some empirical evidence for the effects of education on fertility 
in Australia, and more specifically, on how education affects people’s fertility 
expectation.  
According to economic theory, opportunity cost is one of the most important reasons 
for education affecting people’s fertility decisions. Some studies have estimated the 
forgone earnings of women from child rearing in Australia. Beggs and Chapman 
(1988) conducted the first trial using a 1986 survey. They found that for a woman 
with a secondary level education, a first child is associated with about $435,000 (in 
1997 terms) lower lifetime earnings (after-tax) than for women with no child, and the 
forgone earnings for second and third children are respectively $75,000 and $55,000. 
A re-estimation by Chapman et al. (2001) using data from a 1997 survey shows that 
the impact of having children upon earnings had decreased greatly after one decade, 
and in 1997 for a woman with secondary level education the forgone lifetime earnings 
(after-tax) for having a first child are around $160,000 only. Recently, Breusch and 
Gray (2004) provide new estimates of a mother’s forgone earnings using HILDA 
data. They arrive at similar conclusions, and find that the forgone earnings for a 
second and third child are much bigger than those in the former two studies. Their 
study suggests that a woman having completed year 12 education forgoes around 31% 
of lifetime potential income for a first child, and an additional 13% and 9% for a 
second and third child, respectively. They also find that the proportions of forgone 
earnings are falling with time, more clearly so for women with higher education.  
Given the findings that the opportunity costs of rearing children in terms of foregone 
lifetime earnings of mothers in Australia are decreasing over time, especially for more 
educated women, it is interesting to know whether this is recognised by the Australian 
women, and reflected in their fertility expectation. Since more educated women tend 
to delay their fertility, it is not surprising to find a negative effect of education on 
realised fertility at a given age, but that does not mean they expect to have fewer 
children in their lifetime. A recent report by the Australian Institute of Family Studies 
(Weston et al. 2004) finds that women in their twenties and thirties with lower levels 
of education were not generally more likely than women with higher levels of 
education to want to have children but they were more likely to have had children.  
So far, no published papers have analysed the effects of education on the fertility 
expectation in Australia. One most relevant work is a conference paper by Fisher and 
Charnock (2003) presented at the HILDA Conference 2003. Their focus is the 
association between selected structural factors and fertility expectation and partnering. 
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They constructed a measure of expected lifetime fertility by summing up the number 
of children people ever had and the number of children they would like to have in the 
future. Then they considered three parity progressions: from zero to one or more 
children, from one to two or more children, and from two to three or more children. 
They studied men and women separately in three age groups: 18-29 years, 30-49 
years and 50+ years. Logistic regressions were applied. They found that women’s 
education is clearly linked to higher expectations of childlessness, yet it is far less 
important in understanding expectations for one child and two child families. They 
also suggested that the higher rates of childlessness among higher educated women 
can be partially explained by their lower likelihood of being partnered, and that work 
involvement, rather than education per se, is more important in understanding the 
tendency for women to expect to have fewer children.  
From the point of view of economists, one big weakness of the paper of Fisher and 
Charnock (2003) is that it does not consider the endogenous problems of some key 
explanatory variables, such as partnering status, labour force status, income, and also 
education, which often worry many economists a lot.  
A paper by Yu, Kippen and Chapman (2004), presented at the 12th Biennial 
Conference of Australian Population Association, is also based on the HILDA survey 
and constructs a variable of lifetime fertility in the same way. The main focus of the 
paper is evaluating the HECS effects on people’s intended lifetime fertility, and no 
significant effect was found. It also shows that education affects the intended lifetime 
fertility of men and women differently. For women, the higher the education level, the 
significantly lower the lifetime fertility. For men, on the contrary, those with higher 
education tend to expect more children in their lifetime.   
This paper uses explanatory variables similar to those used by Yu, Kippen and 
Chapman (2004) but tries to answer different questions with a more restrictive sample 
(25-44 years). It attempts to find out whether in Australia more educated people 
expect to have fewer children as predicted by the opportunity-cost argument and to 
look at the difference by age group. The expected lifetime fertility and the expected 
extra number of children will be analysed with more complicated econometric 
methods.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
The dataset used in this research is the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey (first wave, release 2.0), which is a household-based panel 
study initiated and funded by Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) 
and conducted by Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 
Australian Council for Education Research and Australian Institute of Family Studies.  
The survey began in 2001, and interviews are conducted annually. Up to now there 
are three waves available. In this research, only the first wave is used. 
HILDA contains many variables: family formation, fertility, labour force 
participation, education, childcare, income and wealth. It is very rich in fertility and 
other family related information, such as the total children ever had, the intention of 
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having more children in the future and how many more7, marital status and times of 
legal marriage, and many variables relating to child care. More interestingly, HILDA 
survey also asks many questions about people’s religiosity, and attitudes to job and 
family, which may affect people’s fertility preference as well as the perceived costs 
and benefits of children but these are rare in other surveys. To some extent they also 
can help the researcher control for the unobserved heterogeneity and make 
estimations more reliable.  
Although three waves of HILDA are available, only one wave is used in this paper 
because given its short time span many important variables have hardly changed and 
some are only contained in one wave.  So the analyses presented here are just cross-
sectional.  
The sample used in the estimation consists of people aged between 25 and 44. Since 
the key questions of interest are the effects of education on the intended lifetime 
fertility and the expectation of more children in the future, and no female older than 
44 in the Survey expected to have more children in the future, only those younger 
than 45 were retained. To be consistent with the female sample, the male sample was 
also restricted to those younger than 45. The lower bound of age, 25, was chosen 
mainly because at that age most people are likely to have finished their full-time 
education. In fact in the HILDA Survey, the vast majority of people (about 99%) had 
finished their full-time education before age 25 except a few who were still studying.  
Table 1 gives a statistical summary of the key variables in the analyses. A few outliers 
with extremely high realised fertility or expected fertility in the future (having or 
expecting more than 10 children) were excluded from the sample. In total there were 
4843 valid observations in the sample, of which 53.64% were female. On average 
they intended to have 2.08 children in their life, and women intended to have more 
children (2.16) than men (1.99). Of the sample, 32.15% had no child at the time of the 
survey, 16.17% had one child, 28.27% had two children, 15.03% had three children, 
and the other 8.38% had four or more children. In the sample, 71.94% did not expect 
to have any more children, 9.37% expected to have one more child, 13.71% expected 
to have two more, 3.99% expected to have three more, and the other 1% or so 
expected to have four or more children.  
Several dummies were constructed for the highest educational level achieved, 
comprising postgraduate, bachelor, diploma, certificate, year 12, and year 11 or 
below. In the sample, 8.84% had a postgraduate qualification, 16.33% had a bachelor 
degree, 9.8% had a diploma, 30.33% had some kind of certificate, 11.56% had 
finished year 12, and the other 23.13% had completed year 11 or below. A variable of 
years of schooling has been derived as well8, and the average years of schooling were 
about 13 years.  
                                                          
7 One problem is that HILDA only asks people about the number of children they would like to have 
for those who give six or more to the question on the likelihood of having more children in the future 
(on a scale from zero to 10). So the number of children people would like to have is underestimated for 
those who are uncertain about future fertility. To account for this problem, we arbitrarily assign one to 
the variable of expected fertility in the future and find that our key conclusions are basically robust 
under this treatment.  
8 For people with no post-school qualification, years of schooling equals the highest school completed. 
For the others, schooling is assigned 13 if the highest education level achieved is a kind of certificates, 
14 if having got a diploma, 16 if getting a bachelor degree, 17 if getting a postgraduate diploma, and 18 
if having a degree of master or doctorate.  
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Table A.7 shows a breakdown of the key characteristics of the women in the sample 
by education level. Looking at the intended lifetime fertility, it seems to be decreasing 
with education level. It is noteworthy that people with year 11 or below education 
have had more children than all others, while they expect to have fewer extra children 
in the future. In fact on average they have had 2.24 children, well above the intended 
lifetime fertility of most of the other people in the sample. That may be related to their 
relatively lower ability to control for fertility, and not necessarily reflects their 
intention. As shown in the table, the mortality of children is significantly lower for 
people with more education. Among those having ever had children, 2.14% of 
postgraduates once had a child that died, in comparison with 5.13% for people with 
year 11 or below education.  
Several other interesting points should be highlighted. First, the highest average level 
of subjective importance of a paying job and that of motherhood9 appear 
simultaneously at year 11 or below education, while the lowest ones appear 
simultaneously at the level of bachelor. That is somewhat surprising, as it does not 
show evidence of conflict between the attitude to a paying job and the attitude to 
motherhood as expected. Second, the most educated people on average have the 
highest proportion of legal marriage while the least educated people have the highest 
rate of separation/divorce. Third, among the postgraduates, only 3.81% had married 
two or more times, while the fraction of the least educated people is as high as 9.72%. 
Therefore, the effects of education on family formation and the stability of marriage 
appear to be very complex. Fourth, more educated people not only spend more time in 
education, but also tend to spend more time in employment after finishing full-time 
education. That inevitably tightens the time constraint on fertility. Fifth, the 
equivalised household income10 is increasing with education. Six, religiosity seems to 
be positively correlated with education level achieved, with the least educated people 
on average thinking religion the least important.  
The picture for males shares many common features with that for females (see Table 
A.8 in Appendix). For instance, the least educated men also expect the least number 
of extra children in the future, the mortality of children is still decreasing with 
education level, the attitude to paying job and attitude to motherhood still show 
positive correlation, number of siblings is negatively associated with education, and 
equivalised household income is positively correlated with education, and so on. 
However, differences between the sexes are also evident. First, in contrast to females, 
the two male groups with lowest education level have the highest concentration of 
lifetime childlessness. Second, the gap in intended lifetime fertility between education 
levels is much smaller than that for females, so is the gap in realised fertility. Third, 
the proportion of employed males on average is much higher than that of employed 
females, however, except for the least educated category, the differences between 
education levels are not very significant for men. Generally, compared with others, 
                                                          
9 The question for the attitude to paying job in the HILDA Survey is how strongly you disagree or 
agree (corresponding scales 1-7) with the statement that to be happy in life it is important to have a 
paying job. And the question for attitude to motherhood is how strongly you disagree or agree 
(corresponding scales 1-7) with the statement that whatever career a woman may have her most 
important role in life is still that of being a mother. The question for religiosity is how important 
religion is in your life, measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where a value of 0 corresponds to “least 
important” and a value of 10 corresponds to “most important”.  
10 The equivalence scale is constructed as follows: the first adult in the household adds 1 to the scale, 
second and subsequent adults add 0.5 to the scale, and each child below the age of 15 years adds 0.3 to 
the scale. (ABS 2004b) 
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males with year 11 or below education have a significantly lower employment rate, 
higher unemployment rate and higher proportion of being out of labour force.  
Direct tabulation can give a general profile of the fertility and other characteristics of 
people with different education levels, while to have a clearer idea about the 
correlation between education and fertility, applying econometric methods is a 
necessity.  
3.2 Methodology 
Apart from censored-data problem due to the uncompleted fertility of the young 
people, the endogeneity of education is a more challenging problem for the estimation 
of the effects of education on fertility. Children could affect the cost of schooling for 
mothers, “more importantly, women’s schooling could be correlated with unobserved 
traits that are jointly determined with fertility” (Sander 1992:229). Some studies did 
find that negative correlation between schooling and fertility was a product of 
selection (Sander 1992). Using instrument variables is one way to deal with the 
endogenous problem of education, while the difficulty is finding valid instruments. 
Sander (1992) uses mother’s schooling and father’s schooling as instruments for 
education and finds that women’s schooling is not highly endogenous with fertility. It 
is debateable whether education of parents is a valid instrument because it apparently 
affects the household income and may play a role in the formation of children’s 
preferences and attitudes as well.  
Due to the endogeneity problems, the cross-section studies can only reveal the 
correlation between education and fertility rather than the causation. To deal with this 
problem Cheng and Nwachukwu (1997) applied the standard Granger causality test 
(Granger 1980) with time series data. First, with conventional regression method, 
Cheng and Nwachukwu (1997) found that education was statistically significant at the 
1% level and negatively related with fertility; however, with Hsiao’s (1981) version 
of the Granger causality tests they concluded that education did not Granger-cause 
lower fertility.  
In this paper, which uses cross-section data, the Granger causality test cannot be 
applied, and the method of instrument variables is not used either because of the lack 
of valid instruments.  Instead, different strategies have been tried to decrease the 
effects of the potential endogeneity problems and the sensitivity of the conclusions 
has been tested in various ways. Instead of realised fertility, fertility expectation is the 
focus of this paper. Both intended lifetime fertility and the expected extra number of 
children are analysed.  
The literature shows that education affects fertility through various channels. It is 
interesting to know the total effects of education, while economists are usually more 
interested in the effect of the opportunity costs associated with education when people 
decide to have an extra child. To achieve this objective other effects should be 
separated from the total effects as much as possible.  
To examine each of the two expectations, a baseline model is taken as the starting 
point, including education and some exogenous variables such as age, siblings, type 
of school attended and country of origin11 (and also the number of children ever had 
                                                          
11 In line with the World Population Prospects of the United Nations (2003), we have reclassified the 
countries of birth into three categories (apart from Australia): high-fertility countries, medium-fertility 
countries and low-fertility countries. Australia-born people are used as the reference group. 
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for the latter one). Then the model is extended by including more explanatory 
variables step by step, such as state and region of residence, religiosity and attitudes, 
marital status and household income, to see whether the coefficients of education 
variables are sensitive to the inclusion of these additional variables and how they 
change accordingly. In addition, different specifications are used to test the robustness 
of the key conclusions.  
Since the dependent variables—intended lifetime fertility and expected number of 
children in the future—are both non-negative natural figures, Poisson regression is 
applied instead of OLS. The small goodness-of-fit χ2 (large p-value) of the 
regressions also shows the hypothesis that the data are Poisson distributed cannot be 
rejected 12.   
3.2.1 Intended lifetime fertility 
Empirical studies are commonly based on realised fertility (for example, Sander 1992; 
Rosenzweig and Schultz 1985; Bratti 2003). However, realised fertility may be very 
different from lifetime fertility, especially for young people, and the education effect 
is highly likely to be overestimated due to the fact that educated people tend to delay 
their fertility. Using intended lifetime fertility can overcome this weakness to some 
extent, and is also better for testing the theoretical models that abstract from 
unobserved heterogeneity of individuals and unpredictable events. Although many 
people may not achieve their intended fertility due to various reasons (Bryson et al. 
1999; Qu et al. 2000; Barnes 2001), many longitudinal studies have shown that 
individual preferences are often sufficiently stable to have a large effect on 
subsequent fertility (De Silva 1991 and references therein).   
To analyse the intended lifetime fertility, a static, one-period model is applied (see 
Montgomery and Trussell 1986 for a detailed discussion of this kind of model). Here 
a kind of reduced form model is used for estimation.  
Since in Australia about one-third of all births are exnuptial and nearly one-fifth of all 
families with children under 15 are one-parent (mostly lone-mother) families, fertility 
is treated as the outcome of individual decisions instead of a joint decision of married 
couples, while the presence of a partner is viewed as an external constraint.  
Summing up the number of children ever had and the number of children expected in 
the future provides a handy measure of intended lifetime fertility but with certain 
measurement errors. Education variables, which are the key concern here, are always 
included in the models, while the other explanatory variables are carefully selected 
and extended step by step. In the baseline model, apart from the education variables, 
only some exogenous variables are controlled, including age, number of siblings, 
being the oldest child in the family, country of birth, and time since immigration if 
born abroad. As Bratti (2003) suggests, including a wide of family background 
variables is one way of controlling for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.  
In the first extension, a set of dummies for state and region of residence are also 
included. That can control for some state or region-specific factors such as local 
labour market conditions, while the problem is that they are not time invariant and 
could be endogenous as well. For instance, people with strong fertility preference may 
choose to live in places with more family-friendly local policies.  
                                                          
12 For males, some specifications have a large χ2, but tests show little evidence of over-dispersion.  
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The second extension is a set of variables that include religiosity and attitudes to a 
paying job and motherhood. There is a lot of literature, especially in demography, 
showing how religiosity and attitudes affect fertility (for example, Lehrer 1996; 
Hakim 2003; Lehrer 2004 and references therein; McQuillan 2004). Their influences 
are very complicated. Within the framework of economics, religiosity and attitudes 
may work through changing the curvature of people’s utility function. For instance, 
for people with strong religiosity, the price elasticity of child may be very small13. 
Given their importance, these factors are not usually included in the empirical work, 
for different reasons. First, they are hard to quantify. Fortunately, HILDA Survey 
provides handy variables for them. Second, they are not time-invariant either and can 
change with fertility-related experiences. Hakim (2003) suggests that women can be 
grouped into three categories by their lifestyle choices—work-centred, home-centred, 
and adaptive. The preferences of the two polar groups—work-centred and home-
centred—hardly change over time. As Hakim (2003:361) puts it, “they do not waver 
in their goals, even when they fail to achieve them”. In this paper, following Hakim’s 
suggestion, individuals are grouped into three categories by religiosity—very 
important (with a score of 8+), very unimportant (scoring 3-), and others. The sample 
is also divided into three groups by their attitudes to having a paying job and 
motherhood—strongly positive (scoring 6 or 7), strongly negative (scoring 1 or 2), 
and the others in between. The third category—the adaptive one—is used as the 
reference group in the estimation.  
The third extension includes variables of marital history14: married once, married 
twice or more times, and the age of first marriage. Although the importance of 
marriage for fertility is decreasing over time in Australia, it is still one of the most 
important factors. This finding is highlighted by the estimation results.  
The fourth extension includes equivalised household income. The importance of 
income in people’s fertility decision cannot be overemphasised. One well-known 
puzzle is the commonly observed strong negative correlation between income and 
fertility, which is exceptionally true for human society—not for any other animals 
(see Aarssen 2005 for a detailed discussion). The estimation of the static models in 
this paper showed similar results. However, in practice family income is also affected 
greatly by people’s fertility decisions, especially for those whose income is mostly 
from earnings. Therefore it is hard to derive causation from the observed correlation.  
Concerning education variables, either education dummies or years of schooling 
along with the quadratic term of schooling were tried in the estimations. In order to 
see whether education effects are different for different age groups, education 
variables were interacted with age group dummies in some specifications (the 
interaction term of education and age group 25-29 is used as reference). In addition, 
type of school attended and the age of finishing full-time education were also 
controlled in all the specifications.  
                                                          
13 Pollak and Watkins (1993:472) have cited an interview in Mali. When a woman was asked how 
many more children she would like to have, she said, “That’s for God to decide.” When asked for 
lifetime fertility, her answer was, “It’s when God stops my births.” That is an extreme case, but people 
with different levels of religiosity do have different ideas about the costs and benefits of having 
children.  
14 Since the dependent variable in the model contains number of children ever had, variables about 
fertility history, such as having child ever, having a child died ever, and age of youngest/oldest child, 
were not included.  
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The models were estimated separately for men and women; the results of the 
estimation are reported in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.  
3.2.2 Expected extra number of children in the future 
A dilemma exists in the static models discussed above, that is, including the 
potentially endogenous variables may bias the estimation of education effects; when 
excluding them some important information will not be utilised and an omitted 
variable problem appears.  
In this section, the expected extra number of children in the future is analysed with a 
kind of life cycle dynamic model. Apart from the difference in the dependent 
variables, a critical difference between the dynamic model and the static model 
discussed in the last section lies in the inclusion of the number of children ever had in 
the dynamic model. Because the arrival of children imposes constraints on subsequent 
household decisions, including fertility in the future, in the dynamic model the case 
that people adjust their expectations as well as decisions over time is allowed. The 
expectation about future fertility is based on both of the historical experiences and the 
current situation, which are either exogenous or pre-determined. Therefore, although 
the endogenous problems cannot be ruled out, they are at least much less serious here 
than in the static models.  
The education variables are the same as those presented in the previous section, and 
the interaction terms of schooling and age group dummies are also controlled in some 
specifications. In addition, since educated people tend to have had fewer children at a 
certain age especially when young, the education effects may vary by the number of 
children ever had. To test for this, education is also interacted with the number of 
children ever had in some other specifications (reported in Tables A.5, A.6 in 
Appendix).  
Apart from education variables, several other factors may be important for people’s 
fertility expectation. Budget constraint is often the top concern of economists, while it 
is only relevant for people who would like to have child(ren); its importance also 
varies across individuals, so religiosity and attitudes to a paying job and motherhood, 
which may affect people’s fertility preference, should be included in the model. 
Opportunity costs may be different for people currently working and for those not 
working; thus labour force status should be controlled as well. In addition, in most 
cases the presence of a partner is also an important condition for fertility, and people’s 
fertility expectation is inevitably affected by their past fertility experiences; therefore, 
variables about current marital status, having a child died ever, age of oldest child and 
age of youngest child were also included.  
Again, I start with a baseline model and extend it step by step to see the sensitivity of 
the education effects to the extra variables included. In the baseline model, apart from 
the education variables and their interaction terms with age group dummies or the 
number of children ever had, the number of children ever had, the number of siblings, 
being the oldest child in the family, state of residence, region of residence, and age are 
also included. The first extension includes religiosity and attitudes, the second 
extension includes equivalised household income, the third includes employment 
status, and the last one includes current marital status and past fertility experiences. 
The results for women and men are reported in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.   
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4. Estimation results 
As discussed earlier, both the static model and the dynamic model are extended 
several times by including more explanatory variables. In addition, several variations 
of model specifications are also estimated, such as using years of schooling instead of 
education dummies, using age group dummies instead of dummies for each age. In 
this paper it was chosen to report only one variation each for the static and dynamic 
models, and for men and women. The results of other variations are used as a 
reference and can be provided on request.  
4.1 Lifetime fertility expectation of women 
Table 2 shows the results of the static models of intended lifetime fertility for 
women15. Generally, women with the lowest education level—year 11 or below, have 
the highest intended lifetime fertility, and in most cases the intended lifetime fertility 
decreases as education level increases. This finding supports the opportunity cost 
argument and the commonly observed correlation between education and fertility. 
However, it is noteworthy that the differences between education levels become less 
significant when more explanatory variables are included; when marital history and 
equivalised household income are controlled they become very insignificant.  
In the first extension, dummies of state and region of residence are included to control 
for some state and region-specific factors such as local labour market conditions. The 
coefficients of education variables hardly change and are still jointly very significant. 
In the baseline model, postgraduates expect to have about 21%16 fewer children in 
their lifetime than those with year 11 or below education, and after the first extension 
the difference becomes 18.3%.  
Including religiosity alone has little effect on the significance or the value of the 
coefficients of these variables (not shown in the table). However, when variables of 
attitudes are also controlled (in the second reported extension), education dummies 
become jointly insignificant, and individually they are also much less significant than 
before. Generally, women with strong religiosity have significantly higher fertility 
expectation than those thinking religion is the least important in life. The coefficients 
of the dummy variables of attitude to motherhood are even more significant. 
Compared with those having an adaptive attitude to motherhood, women who think 
motherhood is very important have about 13% higher fertility expectation while 
women who think motherhood is very unimportant have about 23% lower fertility 
expectation. The effects of attitude to a paying job are not significant, though as 
expected women who think a paying job is important have lower fertility expectation. 
This underlines the importance of the attitude to motherhood for fertility. In addition, 
schooling is found to be significantly correlated with attitude to motherhood in the 
sample, but it is hard to say whether those women who think motherhood is important 
choose to have less schooling or schooling affects women’s attitude to motherhood, or 
both. As a result, selection effects cannot be ruled out of the observed negative 
correlation between schooling and fertility; not including attitude to motherhood will 
                                                          
15 Since the Pseudo R2 is very small in all these Poisson regressions, OLS was also applied, and the R2 
is much larger than the Pseudo R2 in corresponding Poisson regressions. The conclusions are basically 
the same. To save space, the OLS results are not reported. They can be provided on request.  
16 For Poisson regression, the incidence rate ratio (IRR) for a one-unit change in xi is eβi, and it is 
approximately βi when βi is small.  
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generate an omitted-variable problem and thus cause bias in the estimation of 
education effect.  
The third and fourth extensions are subject to more serious endogenous problems. 
Marital history variables are controlled in the third extension, and the coefficients of 
education dummies become much more insignificant, while marital history variables 
themselves are very significant. Generally, women who have ever been legally 
married on average have much (about 140%) higher fertility expectation than those 
never married, and the later the first marriage, the lower the expectation. Furthermore, 
the size of the effects is much larger than that of any other factors in the model. These 
results confirm the proposition that partnering and family formation provide an 
important channel through which education affects fertility (Fisher and Charnock 
2003). But the problem is that women having higher fertility expectation may be more 
likely to marry and also choose to marry earlier; in other words, marital history could 
be endogenous and in fact is more likely to be so than most of the other variables.    
In the fourth extension, equivalised household income is included, and its coefficient 
is negative, as commonly observed and very significant at the 1% level. The result 
shows that a $10,000 increase in equivalised household income per annum decreases 
the fertility expectation by about 4.7%17. Since the derived variable of intended 
lifetime fertility still contains part of the realised fertility, which may affect household 
income especially for those with earnings as the main source of income, the 
endogeneity problem cannot be ruled out and thus the reliability of the estimation is in 
question. The correlation between schooling and household income is also very 
complex: earnings are greatly affected by education, while higher income in turn 
allows women to pursue higher and usually more expensive education18. 
As for effects of other explanatory variables, the following is a brief summary.  
Generally, the number of siblings shows a significant and positive effect on expected 
lifetime fertility, although the size of the effect is modest. Immigrants on average 
have lower lifetime fertility expectation, while there seems to be a converging pattern 
as time since immigration gets longer, which is shown by the positive sign of the 
coefficient of years since migration. This finding is in line with other studies, such as 
Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald (2000). The differences in lifetime fertility 
expectation between state and region of residence are not significant though women 
living in ACT have slightly higher expectation than in other states and women living 
in major cities have slightly lower expectation than in remoter regions. Since the key 
education variables in the models only refer to the highest achieved education level, 
and do not tell anything about the time of achieving it, age of finishing full-time 
education is controlled to partly account for this problem. The coefficient is 
insignificant, so is that of the type of school attended. Age dummies are also included 
in the models reported in Table 2. This most flexible form of age was used to capture 
the complicated age and cohort effects in most models of this paper.  
                                                          
17 A model that included a quadratic form of equivalised household income was also tried; the income 
effect is convex and the minimum point is between $110,000 and $120,000. Very few women in the 
sample had a higher equivalised household income than that, so for most women the intended lifetime 
fertility is monotonically decreasing with equivalised household income.  
18 A further extension with variables for employment status included was also tried; the coefficients of 
these variables are very significant while the coefficient of income does not change much and is still 
very significant.  
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Since empirical studies show that opportunity costs—in terms of foregone lifetime 
earnings of mothers associated with child rearing—have decreased in the last decade 
or so, especially for educated women (Chapman et al. 2001; Breusch and Gray 2004), 
interaction terms of education and age group dummies are included in one kind of the 
variations of the model. The results are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix (those 
for men are shown in Table A.2). As the table shows, the interaction terms appear to 
be very insignificant, either individually or jointly19. In the meantime, the differences 
between education levels are also insignificant both individually and jointly20. 
To sum up, the exercises of the static models used in this research suggest that more 
education is generally associated with lower expectation of lifetime fertility of 
women, while the significance of the differences between education levels varies with 
the model specification. When marital history and household income are controlled, 
the differences are not significant any more. The static model is always in a dilemma 
over the trade-off between omitting some important variables and ignoring potential 
endogenous problems. Since each specification has its pros and cons, it is very 
difficult to identify the true education effect.  
4.2 Female expected fertility in the future 
As discussed in the methodology section, using dynamic models can partly overcome 
some of the weaknesses of the static models. Table 4 presents a summary of the 
estimated results of the dynamic models for women. The reported specification uses 
education dummies instead of years of schooling to be more flexible and avoid 
forcing the schooling effect to be concave or convex.   
The number of children ever had is grouped into five categories—having no child 
ever, having one child, having two children, having three children, having four or 
more children, and the first category is used as the reference group. As shown in 
Table 4, the extra number of children that women expected to have in the future for 
those with one child is about 31% lower than that for those having no child ever. For 
women with two or more children the expected number drops more dramatically—
about 80% lower than that of the childless women, while the difference in expectation 
between women having two and those having three or more children is not very 
significant. Again, women ever having a child who died have significantly higher 
fertility expectation for the future, showing a strong replacement desire.  
The results for education effects are somewhat surprising—the coefficients of the 
education dummies are all positive and mostly very significant, except those of 
certificate and diploma, in all the specifications. As shown in Table 4, women with 
year 12 education or with a degree have roughly 60% higher fertility expectation in 
the future than those with least education and these effects are very significant. 
Women having a diploma or certificate also expect to have about 30-40% more 
children in the future than the least educated ones, although the effects are less 
                                                          
19 A model using years of schooling, its quadratic form, and its interaction terms with age group 
dummies has also been tried. All the interaction terms are still insignificant, both individually and 
jointly.  
20 OLS regressions show similar results. However, in OLS the education terms are jointly very 
significant in the baseline model at 1% level, and they are still significant at 5% level when state and 
region dummies are included. After religiosity and attitudes have been controlled, they become very 
insignificant even at 10% level.   
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significant. That is contrary to the results in the models of intended lifetime fertility 
and also those in the models of realised fertility, which are not reported in this paper.  
This outcome is a little puzzling and deserves more in-depth analysis and careful 
interpretation. Some suggestions are presented below for how this might be achieved.  
It is important to make sure whether or not the findings are sensitive to different 
model specifications. Different variations of model specifications have been 
estimated, such as using age, age2, age3 and age4 or age group dummies instead of 
dummies for each age, using schooling and schooling2 instead of education dummies, 
and also including interaction terms of education and number of children ever had.  
The conclusions are qualitatively consistent, that is, compared with the least educated 
women, all other women have a higher fertility expectation in the future. Models with 
sub-samples of women with no child, one child, two children, three children, and four 
or more children have also been estimated, and the significance and values of the 
coefficients of education dummies vary with the sub-samples and the model 
specifications. The coefficients are mostly positive, and some are very significant for 
some sub-samples. For the sub-samples of women with three children and those with 
four or more children, the coefficients of education dummies are generally 
insignificant. This result is partly due to the small sample size in these two categories, 
especially for the educated women—very few of them having four or more children.  
As shown in Table A.7, tabulating fertility expectation in the future directly by 
education also shows a positive correlation between them, where the number of 
children ever had is not controlled for.  
With these findings, it could be concluded with some confidence that educated 
women do expect higher fertility in the future than the least educated women. 
However, that does not mean the higher the education level, the higher the expected 
fertility in the future. In fact, the differences between those with year 12, postgraduate 
and bachelor level are not very significant, and the differences between those with 
certificate and those with year 11 or below—the two biggest groups—are 
insignificant as well. In other words, the education effects on expected fertility in the 
future are non-linear.  
The next issue is how to interpret the results. Several other related findings may be 
helpful for understanding the results. The first one is that educated women on average 
have lower intended lifetime fertility while the difference between education levels is 
not significant after considering some important factors such as the household income 
and marital history (Table 2). The second is that the realised fertility of educated 
women is significantly lower than that of the less educated ones (the results not 
reported in this paper). The third one is about completed fertility of women older than 
44 years (different from the sample used in this paper—women between 25 and 44 
years)21. The completed fertility of educated women (45+ years) is also lower than 
that of less educated women, but the gap lies between the gap in realised fertility and 
that in intended lifetime fertility of educated and less educated younger women (25-44 
years). 
A discussion of the interpretations is presented below.  
1. Income effect may be dominant over opportunity cost effect and also 
substitute effect in the fertility decisions of Australian women. Although educated 
                                                          
21 These estimated results can be provided on request.  
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women face higher opportunity costs when making fertility decisions, they also have 
higher earnings if they work, and tend to marry men with higher incomes, and thus 
can afford to have more children. Some studies (for example, McDonald 2000, 
Weston and Parker 2002) point out that financial, job and housing insecurity are also 
concerns for women’s fertility plans. For educated women, with higher household 
income, these worries are less serious. In the HILDA Survey it was found that 
educated women are more likely to own a house than the less educated. In addition, 
for a given age, higher education implies higher opportunity costs of child-rearing; for 
a given education level, the opportunity costs are also likely to be different for women 
at different ages and at different stages of lifecycle. Tables A.1 and A.3 in Appendix 
show estimation results of models with interaction terms of education and age groups. 
These interaction terms have been found to be generally insignificant22. In the 
meantime, the education dummies and their interaction terms with age group 
dummies are jointly very significant until the second extension when equivalised 
household income is controlled. These results indicate that opportunity costs may not 
be an important factor for women’s fertility decisions and the income effect may be 
dominant over the effect of opportunity costs. 
2. Educated women do not necessarily want or expect fewer children than the 
less educated, but since they defer their fertility they may not achieve their intention 
or expectation due to unexpected reasons such as fecundity or partnering problems. 
According to McDonald (2001c, cited in Weston et al. 2004), 7 per cent of women in 
Australia are infertile, and this trend increases with age. While some women attempt 
to extend their reproductive life through assisted reproductive technology, such 
procedures account for only 2 per cent of all births. In addition, evidence shows that 
unhappily married couples are less likely than other couples to have a (further) child 
(Lillard and Waite 1993). In the HILDA sample it was found that satisfaction with a 
partner decreases with age. Furthermore, educated women tend to be more 
independent, and it is more likely for them to have different ideas about fertility to 
their partners; some research also shows that disagreement over fertility intentions 
often leads to lower fertility (Thomson 1997; Greene and Biddlecom 1997, cited in 
Weston et al. 2004). These uncertainties may be underestimated by the educated 
women and thus it is possible for them to overestimate their expected fertility in the 
future.  
3. In contrast, the less educated women may underestimate their fertility in the 
future. Less educated women tend to give birth earlier than educated women, partly 
because they show less concern about the quality of children and thus the necessary 
conditions for having a high-quality child. As shown in Table A.7, the least educated 
women in the sample on average have already had 2.24 children, much higher than 
the intended lifetime fertility of the educated women and perhaps above their own 
expectation as well although that cannot be proven with the current data. Some 
empirical studies show that educated women have a higher ability to control their 
fertility than less educated women (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1985; Schultz 1993; 
                                                          
22 With cross-section data, age effect cannot be discriminated from cohort effect. However, given that 
opportunity costs—in terms of foregone lifetime earnings of mothers—decreased in the last decade, the 
cohort effect should predict a negative sign of the interaction terms of education and age group 
dummies (the interaction term of education and the youngest age group is used as the reference group). 
The age effect also predicts a negative sign at least for the interaction terms of education and the oldest 
age group. As a result, the coefficients of the interaction terms of higher education levels and the oldest 
age group should be negative. The estimation results (Tables A.1 and A.3) provide little evidence for 
that.   
 19
Cheng and Nwachukwu 1997; Lam and Duryea 1999; Basu 2002 and references 
therein), and thus can more efficiently avoid overshooting in fertility.  
The coefficients of other explanatory variables, especially the significant ones, do not 
change much when the interaction terms of education and age group dummies are 
included. In the models of expected fertility in the future, continuous variables of 
religiosity and attitudes to a paying job and motherhood are used instead of dummies. 
The coefficients of religiosity are very significant and stable in all the extensions. 
Given all other factors the same, women thinking religion the most important 
(religiosity variable has a value of 10), expect about 40% higher fertility in the future 
than those thinking religion the least important (religiosity equals 0). The effect of 
attitude to motherhood is also positive and relatively significant and stable. The 
coefficients of attitude to a paying job are insignificant in all the cases.  
Contrary to the results in the static models, equivalised household income in the 
dynamic models shows a significantly positive effect on fertility expectation. This 
finding is consistent with common sense and also the assumption in family economics 
that child is a normal good. If all other factors are the same, women with higher 
household income can afford to pay for longer education and bear higher costs of 
rearing children, so it is not surprising that after controlling for income the education 
effect on fertility becomes insignificant. As expected, currently employed women face 
a higher opportunity cost and thus have a lower fertility expectation (about 17% lower 
than those not in the work force), while the effect is only marginally significant at the 
10% level. The coefficients of being unemployed are very insignificant.  
However, when marital status and past fertility experiences are controlled, the 
coefficient of household income becomes much smaller and insignificant too. As 
Tables 4 and A.3 show, the coefficients of marital status variables are not only jointly 
very significant but also large in size. Generally, women in a de facto relationship 
appear to have the highest expectation of fertility in the future, about 37% higher than 
those never married and not in a de facto relationship. The expected fertility of the 
separated or divorced women is the lowest while the difference with the never 
married is insignificant. The finding that partnering greatly influences female income 
and fertility expectation is also consistent with other empirical studies, such as 
Weston et al. (2004).  
Not surprisingly, the past fertility experiences are among the most important 
influencing factors for future fertility expectation. The age of the oldest child shows a 
very significant and negative effect; one year older of the oldest child lowers the 
expectation by about 7%. The effect of the age of the youngest child is also negative 
and much larger but less significant. Given all other factors the same, one year older 
of the youngest child decreases the fertility expectation by nearly 60%. The result that 
once having a child who died significantly increases the intended lifetime fertility 
gives support to the replacement argument (see Schultz 1969; Kirk 1996). 
In addition, women having attended government schools are found to have 
significantly (about 15%) lower fertility expectation than those attended non-
government schools. Also contrary to the static models, with all other factors the 
same, women living in the ACT tend to expect least number of extra children, and the 
differences to other states and territories are not large. There is no handy explanation 
for this and the reliability of this finding is also an issue due to the relatively small 
sample size of this category (see Table 1). The other explanatory variables including 
country of birth are insignificant too. 
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As more educated women tend to give birth late, they usually have fewer children 
than less educated women at a particular age, especially when young. To see whether 
education effects on expectation of extra fertility in the future are different for women 
with different number of children, other models were estimated, with the interaction 
terms of schooling and number of children ever had (dummies) included. The results 
for women are reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix (Table A.6 shows the results for 
men). As the table shows, the education effect on the expected extra number of 
children is larger for women with child(ren), and it is more significant for women 
with one or two children than for those having more children. However, after 
controlling for equivalised household income, they are not significant any more, again 
indicating strong associations between income, schooling and fertility. In addition, 
with these interaction terms included, the coefficients of the education dummies are 
more significant and larger, especially for the lower education levels. Generally, 
women with year 12 education have the highest expectation, followed by 
postgraduates and bachelors, and then the diploma and certificate holders. Again 
those with lowest education levels have the lowest expectation, everything else being 
equal.  
These results confirm the findings reported in the literature that education affects 
fertility through various channels. Generally, the education effect appears to be non-
linear, not monotonically increasing or decreasing with years of schooling. This may 
be connected with the non-linearity of expected return to schooling. In addition, in 
2002 about 54.4% of all Australian aged 25-64 had a non-school educational 
qualification, so tertiary education in Australia is more likely to be a preference of 
individuals rather than a selective result by ability. Furthermore, the objectives of 
attending a certain kind of education may be different as well. For instance, women 
pursuing a certificate may be more likely aiming to find a job soon, either for personal 
interest or for income reasons. Given the immediate cost of the education and the fast 
changing market demand, these women’s opportunity cost of giving birth is relatively 
high and their interest in fertility may be low. In comparison, the objectives of women 
pursuing postgraduate qualifications may be very different, varying from finding an 
ideal partner—including having more and high-quality children—to self-fulfilment, or 
finding a better job. For women who have finding an ideal partner and forming a 
happy family as the key objectives of attaining higher education, opportunity cost is 
most likely a minor concern for their fertility decisions. Even for those who attend 
education for the purpose of finding a better job, as other empirical studies (for 
example, Bratti 2003 and references therein) suggest, higher education not only 
implies higher opportunity costs of giving birth, but also means higher family income, 
which is also important for fertility. In short, opportunity cost is not necessarily a 
greater concern for women with more education.  
4.3 The gender differences 
So far, this paper has mainly focused on the fertility expectation of women, because 
they are expected to play a key role in fertility decisions. However, some studies 
suggest that the role of men is not negligible (for example, Fisher 2002; Fisher and 
Charnock 2003; Weston et al. 2004). Therefore, the fertility expectation of men was 
also analysed and the results are reported in Tables 3, 5 (also in Tables A.2, A.4 and 
A.6 in the Appendix). A comparison between male and female fertility expectations in 
Australia is drawn below.  
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Concerning the intended lifetime fertility, as shown in Table 3, the education effect 
for men is insignificant in all the model specifications. Interestingly, in the fourth 
extension where equivalised household income is included, the lifetime fertility 
expectation increase with education levels; that is quite different for women. In other 
aspects, there are no qualitative differences between men and women. For instance, 
number of siblings still show a significantly positive effect on fertility expectation, 
and there are few differences in the signs or significance of religiosity and attitudes to 
a paying job and motherhood, nor in marital history and income. Male immigrants 
also expect to have fewer children in their lifetime. The differences between state and 
region of residence are also insignificant. However, a test including a male dummy 
and its interaction terms with all other explanatory variables shows there are 
systematic differences between male and female (the male dummy and its interactions 
terms are jointly very significant), so their expectation was estimated separately23.  
In terms of the expected extra number of children in the future, systematic differences 
between the sexes are found with the same tests discussed above. In the models that 
do not include the interaction terms of education and age group dummies (see Table 
5), compared with the reference group of year 11 or below, all other education 
categories show higher fertility expectation. The differences are mostly very 
significant and hardly change with the extensions. Again, the differences between the 
education categories other than year 11 or below are not large.  
The inclusion of interaction terms of education and age group dummies makes the 
comparison more difficult (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). One big difference 
between the sexes lies in the finding that for men, the education dummies and their 
interaction terms are jointly very significant in all specifications except in the baseline 
model, where they are jointly significant at the 10% level only. It seems that 
education is a more important factor for fertility expectation of men than for women, 
but differences between education levels are also insignificant for men.  
Similar to that for women, the education effect for men also varies with age group but 
is generally insignificant (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). For instance, in the 
youngest age group—those aged 25-29, women with year 12 have higher expected 
fertility than most of the other categories (see Table A.3 in the Appendix), while men 
with year 12 have almost the lowest expectation (see Table A.4 in the Appendix). 
Men with a bachelor degree or diploma have relatively higher fertility expectation 
than others, followed by postgraduates and certificate holders.  
The effect of household income on fertility expectation is relatively smaller for men 
than for women, while in contrast to women, the size and significance of the income 
effect increases as more explanatory variables are controlled. Again, the correlation 
between marital status and fertility expectation in the future appears to be very 
significant. Those in de facto relationships and legally married expect to have 
significantly more children than those who have never married and are not in a de 
facto relationship, while the separated or divorced have a much lower expectation. 
Age of the oldest/youngest child also shows similar effect, while the replacement 
effect appears to be insignificant for men. The effects of religiosity and attitudes to a 
paying job and motherhood are also similar to those recorded for women.  
                                                          
23 After controlling for religiosity and attitudes (second extension) in the models of intended lifetime 
fertility, the differences between male and female become insignificant.   
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Just like for women, a set of models with interaction terms of schooling and number 
of children ever had were also estimated for men, to check whether education effects 
vary with the existing number of children. As shown in Table A.6 in the Appendix, 
the differences are mostly insignificant.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the results of a study on the education effect on people’s 
fertility expectation in Australia, using the first wave of the HILDA Survey conducted 
in 2001. It has looked at how education affects people’s intended lifetime fertility as 
well as their fertility expectation for the future conditional on the fertility history and 
other experiences in the past and on current circumstances.  
Empirical studies have found that apart from increasing opportunity costs of rearing 
children, education also affects fertility through various other channels, such as by 
affecting income, partnering and family formation, timing of marriage and fertility, as 
well as fertility preference. Most of these empirical studies have been based on 
realised fertility, which is subject to both censored data and endogenous variable 
problems. In this paper a variable of intended lifetime fertility was constructed by 
summing up the number of children ever had and the number of children expected to 
have in the future. Using this variable instead of realised fertility can help to avoid the 
censoring problem, though it is not free of other problems. Generally, this kind of 
static model faces the dilemma of trading-off between the endogenous-variable 
problem and the omitted-variable problem. To avoid this dilemma, one type of 
dynamic model has been applied. The key idea of this dynamic model is that people 
adjust their fertility plan according to their experiences in the past and the current 
situation. In such a model, education as well as other explanatory variables are either 
exogenous or predetermined. Therefore, the endogeneity problem is at least less 
serious in the dynamic model than in the static model, although it cannot be ruled out 
entirely.  
The main findings are summarised as follows: 
1. Compared with those having least education, women in other education categories 
generally have lower intended lifetime fertility. When more factors such as 
attitude, income and marital history are controlled, the differences between 
education levels become insignificant.  
2. As for fertility expectation into the future, the more educated people have 
significantly higher expectation than the least educated ones; however, the 
correlation is non-linear.  
3. The differences of education effect between age groups are generally 
insignificant.  
4. Partnering, religiosity and attitude to motherhood, and household income seem to 
play very important roles in both the intended lifetime fertility and the fertility 
expectation into the future. Married people have higher intended lifetime fertility 
than those who have never married, and people with a partner expect to have more 
children in the future than those without a partner. For people having child(ren), 
the older the youngest (and also the oldest) child, the lower the fertility 
expectation. Household income appears to have a significant positive effect on 
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fertility expectation into the future, showing that child is a normal good. 
Religiosity and attitude to motherhood also consistently show a positive effect on 
both the intended lifetime fertility and fertility expectation for the future and the 
effects are mostly very significant.  
Various sensitivity tests, such as using different models specifications and extensions, 
have been tried, and these findings are basically robust. In addition, since in the first 
wave of the HILDA Survey, people who were not sure about their fertility in the 
future—giving FIVE to the question in the survey—were not asked about how many 
more children they expected to have, their fertility expectation was set to zero. That 
may under-estimate their fertility expectation. To account for this problem, two extra 
sensitivity tests were applied for each model in this paper by making different 
assumptions about the fertility expectation of these uncertain people24, and no 
qualitative differences were found either.  
Generally, there is little firm evidence showing that more educated people necessarily 
expect fewer children, either in their lifetime or for the future. In contrast, people 
having attended higher education tend to expect significantly more children in the 
future than people with the lowest education level. Given these findings, it might be 
concluded that higher education per se is not the bane of fertility, at least 
psychologically. It is more likely that people with higher education underestimate the 
potential fertility constraints such as a good and stable relationship and thus 
overestimate their fertility in the future; in the meantime the less educated people may 
underestimate their fertility in the future. This might be why the more educated people 
appear to achieve lower fertility than less educated ones, which is evident when 
looking at the completed fertility of the older people in the HILDA Survey (not 
reported in this paper).  
The findings of this paper have important policy implications. First, the apparent 
conflicting public interest between education and fertility may not be inherent and 
could be overcome with appropriate policies. Second, both the educated people 
themselves and the public should be aware of the constraints that may hinder 
individuals in achieving their fertility expectation, allowing actions to be taken 
beforehand. Third, compared with opportunity costs, family formation and stability 
may be more important in people’s fertility decisions. Fourth, while income seems to 
matter, child is a normal good, and the demand for child is increasing with income, 
apparently the source of income also matters. For most individuals and families, 
income is from earnings, and that forces them to make a trade-off between working 
and fertility. Family friendly policies may help resolve this dilemma.  
 
                                                          
24 One exercise was assigning one—the median number of expected number of children in the future of 
those giving SIX to the question in the survey—to the fertility expectation of the uncertain people. 
Second exercise was assigning one—the median of expected number of children in the future of those 
giving SIX to the question and also would not like to have any more children in the future—to the 
fertility expectation of those who were uncertain about future fertility and would not like to have any 
more children, and assigning two—the median of expected number of children in the future of those 
giving SIX to the question and also would like to have more children in the future—to the fertility 
expectation of those who were uncertain about future fertility and would like to have more children. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Key Variables  
 
Variables Min-Max Mean      
(std. dev) 
No. of 
observations 
Male   (0-1) 0.46 (0.50) 4843 
Preferred lifetime fertility    (0-10) 2.08 (1.32) 4843 
Children ever had    (0-9) 1.55 (1.40) 4843 
    Having no child (0-1) 0.32 (0.47) 4843 
    Having one child (0-1) 0.16 (0.37) 4843 
    Having two children (0-1) 0.28 (0.45) 4843 
    Having three children (0-1) 0.15 (0.36) 4843 
    Having four or more children (0-1) 0.08 (0.28) 4843 
Expected no. of children in the future    (0-10) 0.53 (0.96) 4843 
    Expect no more child (0-1) 0.72 (0.45) 4843 
    Expect one more child (0-1) 0.09 (0.29) 4843 
    Expect two more children (0-1) 0.14 (0.34) 4843 
    Expect three more children (0-1) 0.04 (0.20)  4843 
    Expect four or more extra children (0-1) 0.01 (0.10) 4843 
Single (never married)   (0-1) 0.18 (0.39) 4843 
Legally married   (0-1) 0.59 (0.49) 4843 
In De facto  relationships (0-1) 0.14 (0.35) 4843 
Separated/divorced/widowed   (0-1) 0.08 (0.28) 4843 
Age    (25-44) 35.15 (5.60) 4843 
    Age group 25-29 years (0-1) 0.20 (0.40) 4843 
    Age group 30-34 years (0-1) 0.25 (0.43) 4843 
    Age group 35-39 years (0-1) 0.27 (0.44) 4843 
    Age group 40-44 years (0-1)  0.28 (0.45)  4843 
Years of schooling (5-18) 13.14 (2.42) 4842 
    Postgraduate    (0-1) 0.09 (0.28) 4843 
    Bachelor    (0-1) 0.16 (0.37) 4843 
    Diploma    (0-1) 0.10 (0.30) 4843 
    Certificate    (0-1) 0.30 (0.46) 4843 
    Year 12    (0-1) 0.12 (0.32) 4843 
    Year 11 or below    (0-1) 0.23 (0.42) 4843 
Age of finishing full-time education (8-40) 17.03 (2.08) 4843 
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Attended government schools  (0-1) 0.75 (0.43) 4843 
Attended Catholic or other non-government 
schools  
(0-1) 0.25 (0.43) 
4843 
Attitude to paying job  (1-7) 4.97 (1.88) 4531 
Attitude to motherhood  (1-7) 5.49 (1.79) 4529 
Religiosity    (0-10) 4.08 (3.49) 4842 
New South Wales  (0-1) 0.29 (0.45) 4843 
Victoria  (0-1) 0.25 (0.43) 4843 
Queensland (0-1) 0.21 (0.41) 4843 
South Australia (0-1) 0.09 (0.29) 4843 
South Australia (0-1) 0.10 (0.30) 4843 
South Australia (0-1) 0.03 (0.17) 4843 
South Australia (0-1) 0.01 (0.08) 4843 
ACT   (0-1) 0.02 (0.13) 4843 
Number of marriages  (0-3) 0.78 (0.57) 4842 
    Married once (0-1) 0.64 (0.48) 4843 
    Married twice or more times (0-1) 0.07 (0.25) 4843 
Age of first marriage (13-44) 24.85 (4.44) 3213 
Born in high-fertility countries  (0-1) 0.07 (0.26) 4843 
Born in medium-fertility countries  (0-1) 0.07 (0.25) 4843 
Born in low-fertility countries  (0-1) 0.08 (0.27) 4843 
Australia Born  (0-1) 0.78 (0.41) 4843 
No. of Siblings    (0-25) 2.87 (2.07) 4793 
Relationship with Parents  (0-10) 7.90 (2.33) 4241 
Living in major cities  (0-1) 0.59 (0.49) 4843 
Living in inner regions  (0-1) 0.28 (0.45) 4843 
Living in outer regions  (0-1) 0.11 (0.31) 4843 
Living in remote areas  (0-1) 0.02 (0.13) 4843 
Ever have a child died  (0-1) 0.02 (0.15) 4843 
Time in paid work (years)  (0-30) 14.33 (6.8) 4837 
Time unemployed (looking for work) (years)  (0-24) 0.66 (1.72) 4837 
Equivalised household income (AUS$)  (0-400000) 35433.52 
(25565.79) 3661 
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Table 2: Intended lifetime fertility of women  
 
Dependent variables: Intended lifetime fertility     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate -0.230 -0.207 -0.151 -0.111 -0.055 
 (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.015)** (0.074)* (0.461) 
Bachelor -0.143 -0.121 -0.077 -0.047 0.009 
 (0.004)*** (0.014)** (0.123) (0.354) (0.878) 
Diploma -0.127 -0.112 -0.100 -0.071 -0.051 
 (0.016)** (0.035)** (0.058)* (0.183) (0.411) 
Certificate -0.037 -0.039 -0.040 -0.052 -0.049 
 (0.332) (0.306) (0.303) (0.180) (0.280) 
Year 12 -0.057 -0.044 -0.032 -0.028 -0.016 
 (0.239) (0.358) (0.512) (0.560) (0.781) 
Year 11 or below reference reference reference reference reference 
Age of finishing  -0.011 -0.010 -0.007 -0.0002 0.001 
 full-time education (0.203) (0.245) (0.414) (0.979) (0.920) 
Attended  -0.036 -0.040 -0.014 -0.020 -0.054 
 government schools (0.281) (0.227) (0.671) (0.553) (0.167) 
Number of siblings  0.039 0.038 0.034 0.035 0.028 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Being oldest child 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.011 
 in the family (0.695) (0.629) (0.725) (0.647) (0.757) 
Born in high- -0.113 -0.072 -0.153 -0.186 -0.164 
 fertility countries (0.088)* (0.283) (0.028)** (0.007)*** (0.042)** 
Born in medium- -0.247 -0.212 -0.230 -0.199 -0.166 
 fertility countries (0.001)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.012)** (0.091)* 
Born in low- -0.171 -0.155 -0.135 -0.139 -0.090 
 fertility countries (0.036)** (0.058)* (0.104) (0.093)* (0.360) 
Born in Australia reference reference reference reference reference 
Years since immigration 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.002 
  (0.068)* (0.073)* (0.065)* (0.135) (0.548) 
New South Wales  -0.024 -0.051 -0.029 0.001 
   (0.827) (0.648) (0.793) (0.993) 
Victoria  -0.061 -0.067 -0.045 -0.049 
  (0.586) (0.550) (0.687) (0.724) 
Queensland  -0.094 -0.099 -0.066 -0.047 
  (0.408) (0.387) (0.565) (0.738) 
South Australia  -0.085 -0.096 -0.066 -0.077 
  (0.475) (0.422) (0.578) (0.597) 
Western Australia  -0.029 -0.040 -0.008 -0.025 
  (0.806) (0.738) (0.949) (0.865) 
Tasmania   -0.192 -0.196 -0.159 -0.171 
  (0.160) (0.152) (0.247) (0.293) 
North Australia  -0.270 -0.312 -0.257 -0.367 
   (0.199) (0.138) (0.223) (0.184) 
ACT  reference reference reference reference 
Living in major cities   -0.121 -0.130 -0.101 -0.104 
  (0.272) (0.239) (0.360) (0.446) 
Living in inner regions  0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.044 
  (0.965) (0.988) (0.977) (0.754) 
Living in outer regions  0.084 0.090 0.091 0.048 
   (0.463) (0.431) (0.424) (0.732) 
Living in remote areas  reference reference reference reference 
Thinking religion    0.124 0.096 0.057 
 very important   (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.172) 
Thinking religion   -0.096 -0.074 -0.082 
 very unimportant   (0.004)*** (0.026)** (0.033)** 
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The others in-between   reference reference reference 
Thinking paying job   0.058 0.048 0.026 
 very unimportant   (0.143) (0.228) (0.576) 
Thinking paying job   -0.033 -0.025 -0.015 
 very important   (0.292) (0.423) (0.678) 
The others in-between   reference reference reference 
Thinking motherhood   -0.260 -0.227 -0.209 
 very unimportant   (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** 
Thinking motherhood   0.125 0.111 0.099 
 very important   (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.019)** 
The others in-between   reference reference reference 
Ever married once    0.896 0.923 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Ever married twice    0.887 0.924 
 or more times    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Never married    reference reference 
Age at first marriage    -0.021 -0.022 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Equivalised household     -5.339e-06 
 income     (0.000)*** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant 0.935 1.035 0.933 0.614 0.813 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)*** (0.004)*** 
Observations 2463 2463 2463 2463 1840 
Pseudo R2 0.0136 0.0172 0.0287 0.0467 0.0540 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Table 3: Intended lifetime fertility of men 
Dependent variables: intended lifetime fertility    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.014 0.044 0.065 0.034 0.144 
 (0.844) (0.533) (0.362) (0.635) (0.079)* 
Bachelor 0.020 0.056 0.074 0.033 0.125 
 (0.732) (0.353) (0.221) (0.581) (0.078)* 
Diploma 0.080 0.096 0.111 0.052 0.102 
 (0.207) (0.132) (0.084)* (0.420) (0.181) 
Certificate 0.038 0.043 0.042 -0.006 0.045 
 (0.375) (0.323) (0.337) (0.895) (0.364) 
Year 12 -0.088 -0.058 -0.049 -0.076 -0.003 
 (0.188) (0.385) (0.468) (0.258) (0.965) 
Year 11 or below reference reference reference reference reference 
Age of finishing  -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 0.001 0.001 
 full-time education (0.217) (0.300) (0.390) (0.928) (0.950) 
Attended  -0.052 -0.060 -0.038 -0.044 -0.012 
 government schools (0.162) (0.111) (0.315) (0.250) (0.782) 
Number of siblings 0.040 0.039 0.033 0.030 0.026 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** 
Being oldest child -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.012 0.016 
 in the family (0.933) (0.987) (0.922) (0.740) (0.694) 
Born in high- -0.038 0.003 -0.109 -0.106 -0.111 
 fertility countries (0.614) (0.968) (0.170) (0.180) (0.225) 
Born in medium- -0.063 -0.029 -0.054 -0.018 -0.096 
 fertility countries (0.433) (0.723) (0.509) (0.823) (0.324) 
Born in low- -0.068 -0.050 -0.063 -0.057 -0.042 
 fertility countries (0.460) (0.595) (0.500) (0.539) (0.695) 
Born in Australia reference reference reference reference reference 
Years since immigration 0.0005 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.0006 
  (0.878) (0.787) (0.590) (0.772) (0.914) 
New South Wales  0.099 0.069 0.095 0.147 
   (0.431) (0.586) (0.455) (0.334) 
Victoria  0.135 0.130 0.155 0.170 
  (0.286) (0.306) (0.222) (0.264) 
Queensland  0.144 0.127 0.148 0.205 
  (0.261) (0.324) (0.250) (0.182) 
South Australia  0.112 0.089 0.138 0.207 
  (0.402) (0.504) (0.303) (0.192) 
Western Australia   0.087 0.085 0.143 0.174 
  (0.515) (0.526) (0.285) (0.271) 
Tasmania   -0.037 -0.042 -0.005 0.053 
  (0.817) (0.791) (0.975) (0.767) 
North Australia   -0.292 -0.255 -0.226 -0.246 
  (0.287) (0.352) (0.409) (0.441) 
ACT  reference reference reference reference 
Living in major cities  0.044 0.062 0.092 0.077 
   (0.737) (0.637) (0.485) (0.622) 
Living in inner regions   0.184 0.186 0.165 0.125 
  (0.168) (0.165) (0.219) (0.437) 
Living in outer regions   0.179 0.196 0.217 0.159 
  (0.187) (0.149) (0.111) (0.329) 
Living in remote areas  reference reference reference reference 
Thinking religion    0.123 0.094 0.056 
 very important   (0.006)*** (0.037)** (0.289) 
Thinking religion   -0.088 -0.052 -0.059 
 very unimportant   (0.014)** (0.147) (0.145) 
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The others in-between   reference reference reference 
Thinking paying job   0.024 0.050 0.070 
 very unimportant   (0.680) (0.395) (0.292) 
Thinking paying job   0.006 0.009 -0.003 
 very important   (0.874) (0.810) (0.948) 
The others in-between   reference reference reference 
Thinking motherhood   -0.187 -0.183 -0.171 
 very unimportant   (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.016)** 
Thinking motherhood   0.115 0.084 0.078 
 very important   (0.002)*** (0.022)** (0.061)* 
The others in-between   reference reference reference 
Ever married once    1.118 1.091 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Ever married twice    1.131 1.134 
 or more times    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Never married    reference reference 
Age at first marriage     -0.024 -0.023 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Equivalised household     -3.314e-06 
 income     (0.000)*** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant 0.529 0.269 0.223 -0.134 -0.097 
 (0.005)*** (0.300) (0.397) (0.612) (0.754) 
Observations 2084 2084 2084 2084 1617 
Pseudo R2 0.0101 0.0137 0.0224 0.0521 0.0557 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.   
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Table 4: Female expected fertility in the future 
 
Dependent variables: expected extra number of children in the future 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.471 0.528 0.407 0.432 0.377 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.014)** (0.010)*** (0.025)** 
Bachelor 0.465 0.495 0.398 0.418 0.362 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.010)*** 
Diploma 0.330 0.332 0.251 0.273 0.224 
 (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.091)* (0.067)* (0.135) 
Certificate 0.246 0.235 0.206 0.212 0.163 
 (0.036)** (0.052)* (0.116) (0.106) (0.219) 
Year 12 0.489 0.518 0.464 0.481 0.450 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Year 11 or below reference reference reference reference reference 
Age of finishing  0.020 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.016 
 full-time education (0.230) (0.146) (0.180) (0.222) (0.418) 
Attended  -0.192 -0.184 -0.158 -0.150 -0.181 
 government schools (0.005)*** (0.010)*** (0.044)** (0.056)* (0.022)** 
Number of siblings -0.004 -0.014 -0.021 -0.026 -0.016 
 (0.829) (0.517) (0.352) (0.265) (0.483) 
Being oldest child -0.085 -0.093 -0.108 -0.116 -0.105 
 in the family (0.210) (0.186) (0.161) (0.134) (0.177) 
Born in high- 0.137 -0.059 0.167 0.155 0.170 
 fertility countries (0.348) (0.714) (0.350) (0.387) (0.350) 
Born in medium- -0.202 -0.302 -0.107 -0.105 -0.131 
 fertility countries (0.196) (0.069)* (0.583) (0.589) (0.505) 
Born in low- 0.122 0.051 0.119 0.110 0.084 
 fertility countries (0.443) (0.772) (0.536) (0.567) (0.668) 
Born in Australia reference reference reference reference reference 
Years since immigration -0.009 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.236) (0.397) (0.188) (0.194) (0.208) 
Having one child -0.371 -0.408 -0.372 -0.439 -1.188 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.005)*** 
Having two children -1.711 -1.773 -1.703 -1.767 -2.323 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having three children -1.805 -1.850 -1.658 -1.718 -2.307 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having four or more -1.534 -1.618 -1.577 -1.681 -2.210 
 children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having no child reference reference reference reference reference 
New South Wales 0.591 0.606 0.658 0.668 0.617 
  (0.024)** (0.025)** (0.037)** (0.034)** (0.051)* 
Victoria 0.597 0.646 0.686 0.699 0.628 
 (0.022)** (0.016)** (0.028)** (0.026)** (0.045)** 
Queensland 0.578 0.648 0.737 0.754 0.680 
 (0.029)** (0.018)** (0.021)** (0.018)** (0.033)** 
South Australia 0.674 0.702 0.796 0.808 0.722 
 (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.029)** 
Western Australia  0.738 0.766 0.783 0.793 0.741 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.016)** (0.015)** (0.022)** 
Tasmania  0.557 0.617 0.678 0.718 0.569 
 (0.089)* (0.065)* (0.070)* (0.056)* (0.131) 
North Australia  0.772 0.819 0.490 0.523 0.529 
 (0.073)* (0.062)* (0.364) (0.332) (0.327) 
ACT reference reference reference reference reference 
Living in major cities 0.056 0.159 0.279 0.296 0.387 
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  (0.802) (0.495) (0.287) (0.260) (0.143) 
Living in inner regions 0.073 0.180 0.319 0.335 0.405 
  (0.754) (0.458) (0.245) (0.223) (0.145) 
Living in outer regions 0.171 0.348 0.456 0.481 0.581 
  (0.483) (0.170) (0.114) (0.096)* (0.047)** 
Living in remote areas  reference reference reference reference 
Religiosity   0.035 0.032 0.033 0.032 
  (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
Attitude to paying job  -0.007 0.009 0.013 0.013 
  (0.683) (0.658) (0.503) (0.526) 
Attitude to  0.044 0.043 0.042 0.039 
 motherhood  (0.015)** (0.029)** (0.035)** (0.050)* 
Equivalised household    4.287e-06 4.426e-06 2.779e-06 
 income   (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.105) 
Being employed    -0.181 -0.088 
    (0.090)* (0.423) 
Being unemployed    -0.185 -0.097 
    (0.465) (0.710) 
Not in the labour force    reference reference 
Legally married     0.178 
     (0.082)* 
In de facto      0.313 
 relationship     (0.003)*** 
Separated or divorced     -0.168 
     (0.421) 
Never married and not de facto     reference 
Ever had a child died     1.103 
     (0.000)*** 
Age of oldest child     -0.071 
     (0.000)*** 
Age of youngest child     -0.917 
     (0.031)** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant -0.605 -1.141 -1.488 -1.343 -1.347 
 (0.191) (0.022)** (0.009)*** (0.020)** (0.020)** 
Observations 2463 2310 1760 1760 1760 
Pseudo R2 0.3544 0.3607 0.3605 0.3613 0.3741 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Table 5: Male expected fertility in the future 
 
Dependent variables: expected extra number of children in the future 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.332 0.482 0.443 0.451 0.389 
 (0.017)** (0.001)*** (0.010)** (0.010)*** (0.025)** 
Bachelor 0.288 0.424 0.432 0.446 0.383 
 (0.013)** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** 
Diploma 0.403 0.509 0.457 0.477 0.471 
 (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Certificate 0.217 0.266 0.318 0.331 0.294 
 (0.030)** (0.014)** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.018)** 
Year 12 0.172 0.277 0.360 0.368 0.306 
 (0.163) (0.037)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.041)** 
Year 11 or below reference reference reference reference reference 
Age of finishing  0.033 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.025 
 full-time education (0.014)** (0.025)** (0.092)* (0.131) (0.119) 
Attended  -0.250 -0.166 -0.072 -0.068 -0.042 
 government schools (0.000)*** (0.015)** (0.358) (0.380) (0.592) 
Number of siblings 0.028 0.017 0.019 0.022 0.016 
 (0.092)* (0.345) (0.333) (0.267) (0.437) 
Being oldest child -0.019 -0.012 0.010 0.014 0.025 
 in the family (0.761) (0.860) (0.899) (0.855) (0.748) 
Born in high- 0.298 0.075 0.216 0.216 0.271 
 fertility countries (0.015)** (0.590) (0.181) (0.182) (0.101) 
Born in medium- 0.284 0.274 0.129 0.118 0.040 
 fertility countries (0.037)** (0.066)* (0.477) (0.514) (0.824) 
Born in low- 0.339 0.359 0.280 0.269 0.265 
 fertility countries (0.030)** (0.028)** (0.139) (0.157) (0.160) 
Born in Australia reference reference reference reference reference 
Years since immigration  -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.202) (0.217) (0.351) (0.374) (0.471) 
Having one child -0.360 -0.395 -0.389 -0.379 -1.210 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having two children -1.500 -1.542 -1.508 -1.499 -2.229 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having three children -1.817 -1.901 -1.824 -1.820 -2.521 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having four or more -1.255 -1.267 -1.210 -1.214 -1.916 
 children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having no child reference reference reference reference reference 
New South Wales 0.324 0.252 0.449 0.455 0.506 
  (0.177) (0.297) (0.152) (0.147) (0.107) 
Victoria 0.467 0.438 0.591 0.605 0.626 
 (0.050)* (0.068)* (0.058)* (0.053)* (0.045)** 
Queensland 0.459 0.414 0.621 0.626 0.673 
 (0.058)* (0.090)* (0.050)** (0.048)** (0.034)** 
South Australia 0.530 0.450 0.734 0.734 0.752 
 (0.034)** (0.075)* (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.020)** 
Western Australia  0.478 0.458 0.596 0.600 0.658 
 (0.054)* (0.066)* (0.062)* (0.061)* (0.040)** 
Tasmania  0.412 0.435 0.589 0.597 0.569 
 (0.171) (0.151) (0.107) (0.102) (0.120) 
North Australia  0.344 0.072 0.285 0.294 0.282 
 (0.459) (0.890) (0.616) (0.605) (0.620) 
ACT reference reference reference reference reference 
Living in major cities  0.652 0.541 0.608 0.603 0.672 
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 (0.024)** (0.062)* (0.067)* (0.069)* (0.041)** 
Living in inner regions  0.700 0.581 0.667 0.659 0.702 
 (0.017)** (0.049)** (0.049)** (0.051)* (0.037)** 
Living in outer regions 0.464 0.474 0.495 0.480 0.538 
 (0.126) (0.121) (0.159) (0.171) (0.125) 
Living in remote areas  reference reference reference reference 
Religiosity   0.040 0.041 0.039 0.044 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Attitude to paying job  0.002 0.011 0.011 0.017 
  (0.889) (0.591) (0.580) (0.394) 
Attitude to motherhood  0.059 0.055 0.058 0.070 
  (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** 
Equivalised    1.890e-06 2.059e-06 3.425e-06 
 household income   (0.080)* (0.060)* (0.006)*** 
Being employed    -0.250 -0.348 
    (0.102) (0.025)** 
Being unemployed    -0.415 -0.420 
    (0.070)* (0.071)* 
Not in the labour force    reference reference 
Legally married     0.363 
     (0.000)*** 
In de facto      0.471 
 relationship     (0.000)*** 
Separated or divorced     -0.626 
     (0.020)** 
Never married and not de facto     reference 
Ever had a child died     0.333 
     (0.433) 
Age of oldest child     -0.025 
     (0.084)* 
Age of youngest child     -0.785 
     (0.001)*** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant -1.434 -1.834 -2.197 -1.959 -2.333 
 (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 2084 1943 1536 1536 1536 
Pseudo R2 0.2623 0.2703 0.2634 0.2645 0.2807 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Appendix  
Table A.1: Intended lifetime fertility of women  
 
Dependent variables: Intended lifetime fertility  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate -0.123 -0.091 -0.063 -0.111 0.005 
 (0.394) (0.534) (0.668) (0.451) (0.973) 
Bachelor -0.152 -0.112 -0.074 -0.105 -0.004 
 (0.119) (0.255) (0.451) (0.286) (0.975) 
Diploma -0.237 -0.209 -0.194 -0.204 -0.179 
 (0.053)* (0.088)* (0.114) (0.096)* (0.188) 
Certificate -0.137 -0.127 -0.128 -0.161 -0.144 
 (0.135) (0.170) (0.166) (0.081)* (0.163) 
Year 12 -0.122 -0.108 -0.129 -0.133 -0.090 
 (0.265) (0.325) (0.244) (0.228) (0.466) 
Postgraduate *  -0.261 -0.255 -0.199 -0.116 -0.039 
 age group 30-34 (0.171) (0.182) (0.300) (0.547) (0.854) 
Postgraduate * -0.032 -0.052 -0.032 0.043 -0.060 
 age group 35-39 (0.853) (0.760) (0.854) (0.802) (0.761) 
Postgraduate * -0.149 -0.156 -0.123 0.024 -0.107 
 age group 40-44 (0.400) (0.379) (0.487) (0.893) (0.600) 
Bachelor * -0.057 -0.069 -0.046 0.007 0.018 
 age group 30-34 (0.660) (0.598) (0.726) (0.955) (0.901) 
Bachelor * 0.098 0.064 0.054 0.102 0.036 
 age group 35-39 (0.438) (0.612) (0.669) (0.423) (0.809) 
Bachelor * -0.043 -0.066 -0.051 0.079 -0.029 
 age group 40-44 (0.738) (0.611) (0.691) (0.542) (0.850) 
Diploma * 0.081 0.079 0.068 0.090 0.135 
age group 30-34 (0.605) (0.617) (0.668) (0.570) (0.442) 
Diploma * 0.229 0.202 0.189 0.219 0.209 
 age group 35-39 (0.131) (0.184) (0.212) (0.148) (0.222) 
Diploma * 0.069 0.062 0.073 0.157 0.127 
 age group 40-44 (0.661) (0.694) (0.643) (0.320) (0.481) 
Certificate * 0.102 0.103 0.100 0.096 0.081 
 age group 30-34 (0.389) (0.388) (0.403) (0.422) (0.545) 
Certificate * 0.173 0.145 0.143 0.155 0.174 
 age group 35-39 (0.128) (0.205) (0.211) (0.175) (0.183) 
Certificate * 0.080 0.066 0.073 0.132 0.089 
 age group 40-44 (0.491) (0.569) (0.527) (0.255) (0.506) 
year 12 * 0.110 0.121 0.158 0.133 0.143 
age group 30-34 (0.424) (0.380) (0.252) (0.333) (0.362) 
year 12 * 0.118 0.119 0.161 0.169 0.099 
 age group 35-39 (0.410) (0.405) (0.263) (0.240) (0.555) 
year 12 * -0.016 -0.028 0.020 0.059 0.017 
 age group 40-44 (0.911) (0.842) (0.888) (0.672) (0.917) 
Age of finishing  -0.010 -0.009 -0.006 0.001 0.001 
 full-time education (0.252) (0.291) (0.461) (0.951) (0.920) 
Attended  -0.037 -0.042 -0.016 -0.021 -0.056 
 government schools (0.264) (0.212) (0.640) (0.525) (0.158) 
Number of  0.039 0.038 0.034 0.035 0.027 
 siblings (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** 
Being oldest child 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.012 0.008 
 in the family (0.747) (0.672) (0.774) (0.690) (0.821) 
Born in high- -0.116 -0.075 -0.152 -0.190 -0.156 
 fertility countries (0.082)* (0.270) (0.030)** (0.007)*** (0.055)* 
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Born in medium- -0.252 -0.218 -0.235 -0.203 -0.165 
 fertility countries (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.011)** (0.093)* 
Born in low- -0.179 -0.164 -0.142 -0.146 -0.092 
 fertility countries (0.029)** (0.047)** (0.088)* (0.080)* (0.354) 
Years since  0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002 
 immigration (0.053)* (0.055)* (0.051)* (0.108) (0.528) 
New South Wales  -0.011 -0.040 -0.023 0.008 
   (0.923) (0.723) (0.839) (0.955) 
Victoria  -0.045 -0.053 -0.036 -0.038 
  (0.689) (0.637) (0.752) (0.785) 
Queensland  -0.077 -0.084 -0.056 -0.038 
  (0.498) (0.461) (0.626) (0.790) 
South  -0.069 -0.081 -0.056 -0.068 
 Australia  (0.563) (0.496) (0.642) (0.644) 
Western   -0.017 -0.029 -0.001 -0.018 
 Australia  (0.886) (0.804) (0.992) (0.904) 
Tasmania   -0.178 -0.186 -0.151 -0.166 
  (0.195) (0.177) (0.273) (0.310) 
North   -0.249 -0.294 -0.249 -0.354 
 Australia  (0.238) (0.164) (0.238) (0.202) 
Living in   -0.118 -0.126 -0.100 -0.098 
 major cities  (0.285) (0.252) (0.364) (0.477) 
Living in   0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.035 
 inner regions  (0.941) (0.984) (0.969) (0.802) 
Living in   0.085 0.091 0.090 0.049 
 outer regions  (0.455) (0.425) (0.433) (0.731) 
Thinking religion    0.120 0.090 0.055 
 very important   (0.001)*** (0.011)** (0.189) 
Thinking religion   -0.095 -0.076 -0.081 
 very unimportant   (0.004)*** (0.023)** (0.036)** 
Thinking paying job   0.054 0.046 0.025 
 very unimportant   (0.173) (0.253) (0.596) 
Thinking paying job   -0.035 -0.027 -0.018 
 very important   (0.256) (0.384) (0.627) 
Thinking motherhood   -0.260 -0.224 -0.213 
 very unimportant   (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.006)*** 
Thinking motherhood   0.127 0.114 0.099 
 very important   (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.020)** 
Ever married once    0.896 0.915 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Ever married twice    0.885 0.913 
 or more times    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Age at first     -0.020 -0.022 
 marriage    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Equivalised      -5.436e-06 
 household income     (0.000)*** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant 0.963 1.037 0.950 0.666 0.852 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** 
Observations 2463 2463 2463 2463 1840 
Pseudo R2 0.0148 0.0184 0.0297 0.0474 0.0547 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Table A.2: Intended lifetime fertility of men  
 
Dependent variables: Intended lifetime fertility  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.110 0.161 0.115 0.082 0.113 
 (0.552) (0.386) (0.537) (0.660) (0.589) 
Bachelor 0.084 0.127 0.142 0.106 0.195 
 (0.554) (0.374) (0.323) (0.461) (0.236) 
Diploma 0.095 0.131 0.111 0.108 0.144 
 (0.598) (0.468) (0.540) (0.549) (0.475) 
Certificate 0.005 0.014 0.000 -0.090 -0.025 
 (0.970) (0.910) (0.999) (0.476) (0.861) 
Year 12 -0.059 -0.047 -0.069 -0.134 -0.027 
 (0.697) (0.761) (0.652) (0.381) (0.874) 
Postgraduate *  -0.170 -0.184 -0.101 -0.128 0.001 
 age group 30-34 (0.462) (0.427) (0.661) (0.581) (0.997) 
Postgraduate * -0.124 -0.146 -0.087 -0.111 -0.103 
 age group 35-39 (0.579) (0.512) (0.697) (0.619) (0.687) 
Postgraduate * -0.068 -0.097 -0.017 0.014 0.126 
 age group 40-44 (0.745) (0.645) (0.937) (0.948) (0.592) 
Bachelor * -0.202 -0.202 -0.180 -0.182 -0.216 
 age group 30-34 (0.244) (0.246) (0.300) (0.296) (0.277) 
Bachelor * 0.011 -0.002 0.005 -0.034 -0.028 
 age group 35-39 (0.951) (0.992) (0.976) (0.844) (0.886) 
Bachelor * -0.060 -0.073 -0.090 -0.079 -0.044 
 age group 40-44 (0.726) (0.669) (0.600) (0.644) (0.824) 
Diploma * -0.088 -0.103 -0.024 -0.056 -0.026 
age group 30-34 (0.687) (0.640) (0.915) (0.797) (0.918) 
Diploma * 0.015 -0.015 0.017 -0.038 -0.054 
 age group 35-39 (0.943) (0.943) (0.939) (0.860) (0.829) 
Diploma * 0.004 -0.017 0.003 -0.093 -0.066 
 age group 40-44 (0.983) (0.936) (0.987) (0.655) (0.779) 
Certificate * -0.068 -0.058 -0.032 0.041 0.057 
 age group 30-34 (0.649) (0.698) (0.834) (0.786) (0.739) 
Certificate * 0.107 0.094 0.108 0.113 0.109 
 age group 35-39 (0.468) (0.526) (0.468) (0.447) (0.517) 
Certificate * 0.065 0.056 0.060 0.130 0.079 
 age group 40-44 (0.651) (0.700) (0.678) (0.373) (0.638) 
year 12 * -0.008 0.017 0.053 0.089 0.081 
age group 30-34 (0.967) (0.931) (0.785) (0.643) (0.701) 
year 12 * -0.111 -0.091 -0.029 -0.009 -0.149 
 age group 35-39 (0.592) (0.661) (0.889) (0.964) (0.525) 
year 12 * -0.051 -0.020 0.010 0.094 0.076 
 age group 40-44 (0.797) (0.920) (0.960) (0.638) (0.735) 
Age of finishing  -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 0.002 0.002 
 full-time education (0.258) (0.343) (0.411) (0.839) (0.830) 
Attended  -0.051 -0.058 -0.036 -0.041 -0.009 
 government schools (0.174) (0.124) (0.340) (0.280) (0.833) 
Number of  0.040 0.038 0.033 0.029 0.025 
 siblings (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** 
Being oldest child -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 0.006 0.010 
 in the family (0.818) (0.876) (0.835) (0.853) (0.794) 
Born in high- -0.044 -0.002 -0.108 -0.105 -0.110 
 fertility countries (0.565) (0.980) (0.177) (0.187) (0.230) 
Born in medium- -0.061 -0.027 -0.050 -0.015 -0.090 
 fertility countries (0.446) (0.737) (0.544) (0.856) (0.361) 
Born in low- -0.076 -0.056 -0.065 -0.061 -0.051 
 37
 fertility countries (0.411) (0.547) (0.485) (0.514) (0.638) 
Years since  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 immigration (0.842) (0.760) (0.602) (0.768) (0.889) 
New South Wales  0.100 0.070 0.090 0.152 
   (0.431) (0.581) (0.478) (0.319) 
Victoria  0.139 0.134 0.153 0.173 
  (0.273) (0.293) (0.228) (0.258) 
Queensland  0.143 0.126 0.145 0.206 
  (0.266) (0.326) (0.261) (0.182) 
South  0.110 0.088 0.133 0.209 
 Australia  (0.412) (0.511) (0.321) (0.189) 
Western   0.091 0.089 0.143 0.188 
 Australia  (0.498) (0.504) (0.286) (0.234) 
Tasmania   -0.024 -0.029 0.003 0.072 
  (0.881) (0.854) (0.985) (0.691) 
North   -0.286 -0.247 -0.222 -0.256 
 Australia  (0.297) (0.368) (0.420) (0.424) 
Living in   0.036 0.055 0.087 0.062 
 major cities  (0.787) (0.679) (0.509) (0.693) 
Living in   0.174 0.177 0.159 0.108 
 inner regions  (0.195) (0.189) (0.238) (0.502) 
Living in   0.175 0.192 0.217 0.149 
 outer regions  (0.199) (0.158) (0.112) (0.364) 
Thinking religion    0.120 0.090 0.049 
 very important   (0.008)*** (0.046)** (0.353) 
Thinking religion   -0.089 -0.055 -0.065 
 very unimportant   (0.013)** (0.123) (0.111) 
Thinking paying job   0.027 0.052 0.072 
 very unimportant   (0.651) (0.372) (0.280) 
Thinking paying job   0.006 0.009 -0.004 
 very important   (0.875) (0.798) (0.914) 
Thinking motherhood   -0.192 -0.187 -0.178 
 very unimportant   (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.013)** 
Thinking motherhood   0.112 0.080 0.075 
 very important   (0.002)*** (0.029)** (0.075)* 
Ever married once    1.131 1.101 
    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Ever married twice    1.148 1.145 
 or more times    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Age at first     -0.024 -0.023 
 marriage    (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Equivalised      -3.375e-06 
 household income     (0.000)*** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant 0.517 0.265 0.245 -0.098 -0.076 
 (0.016)** (0.343) (0.389) (0.730) (0.819) 
Observations 2084 2084 2084 2084 1617 
Pseudo R2 0.0111 0.0146 0.0232 0.0531 0.0573 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Table A.3: Female expected fertility in the future  
Dependent variables: expected extra number of children in the future 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.282 0.290 0.248 0.249 0.239 
 (0.159) (0.157) (0.271) (0.270) (0.290) 
Bachelor 0.233 0.226 0.142 0.140 0.096 
 (0.143) (0.171) (0.431) (0.438) (0.594) 
Diploma 0.092 0.076 0.023 0.031 -0.016 
 (0.613) (0.684) (0.907) (0.878) (0.938) 
Certificate 0.147 0.112 0.103 0.088 0.030 
 (0.348) (0.487) (0.548) (0.607) (0.864) 
Year 12 0.280 0.299 0.339 0.342 0.313 
 (0.099)* (0.086)* (0.070)* (0.067)* (0.096)* 
Postgraduate *  0.267 0.365 0.368 0.419 0.310 
 age group 30-34 (0.380) (0.237) (0.267) (0.209) (0.353) 
Postgraduate * 0.603 0.596 0.249 0.312 0.127 
 age group 35-39 (0.104) (0.115) (0.588) (0.499) (0.783) 
Postgraduate * 0.412 1.046 0.581 0.613 0.389 
 age group 40-44 (0.557) (0.225) (0.516) (0.494) (0.664) 
Bachelor * 0.522 0.567 0.632 0.673 0.584 
 age group 30-34 (0.035)** (0.025)** (0.020)** (0.013)** (0.032)** 
Bachelor * 0.472 0.554 0.492 0.557 0.526 
 age group 35-39 (0.180) (0.118) (0.223) (0.169) (0.194) 
Bachelor * 0.291 0.718 0.650 0.691 0.575 
 age group 40-44 (0.665) (0.404) (0.456) (0.428) (0.510) 
Diploma * 0.563 0.535 0.596 0.622 0.589 
age group 30-34 (0.052)* (0.074)* (0.064)* (0.054)* (0.069)* 
Diploma * 0.524 0.549 0.408 0.444 0.352 
 age group 35-39 (0.182) (0.166) (0.363) (0.323) (0.436) 
Diploma * -0.743 0.270 -0.133 -0.098 -0.302 
 age group 40-44 (0.515) (0.828) (0.915) (0.938) (0.810) 
Certificate * 0.378 0.395 0.384 0.430 0.406 
 age group 30-34 (0.148) (0.142) (0.186) (0.140) (0.164) 
Certificate * -0.287 -0.253 -0.212 -0.165 -0.168 
 age group 35-39 (0.476) (0.539) (0.644) (0.719) (0.715) 
Certificate * -0.867 -0.292 -0.901 -0.841 -0.789 
 age group 40-44 (0.333) (0.776) (0.471) (0.501) (0.528) 
year 12 * 0.439 0.406 0.304 0.330 0.317 
age group 30-34 (0.107) (0.152) (0.330) (0.289) (0.309) 
year 12 * 0.715 0.740 0.406 0.463 0.376 
 age group 35-39 (0.054)* (0.047)** (0.352) (0.290) (0.391) 
year 12 * -1.291 -0.667 -0.913 -0.908 -1.116 
 age group 40-44 (0.256) (0.592) (0.465) (0.467) (0.373) 
Age of finishing  0.021 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.019 
 full-time education (0.190) (0.108) (0.126) (0.160) (0.328) 
Attended  -0.211 -0.198 -0.169 -0.161 -0.187 
 government schools (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.032)** (0.042)** (0.019)** 
Number of  -0.000 -0.008 -0.015 -0.020 -0.017 
 siblings (0.992) (0.690) (0.505) (0.391) (0.468) 
Being oldest child -0.094 -0.098 -0.119 -0.128 -0.108 
 in the family (0.166) (0.164) (0.125) (0.100)* (0.168) 
Born in high- 0.110 -0.091 0.133 0.116 0.154 
 fertility countries (0.452) (0.574) (0.463) (0.521) (0.403) 
Born in medium- -0.180 -0.280 -0.089 -0.083 -0.130 
 fertility countries (0.252) (0.094)* (0.648) (0.672) (0.510) 
Born in low- 0.123 0.050 0.108 0.095 0.054 
 fertility countries (0.442) (0.777) (0.579) (0.623) (0.787) 
Years since  -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
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 immigration (0.296) (0.481) (0.254) (0.269) (0.297) 
Having one child -0.413 -0.448 -0.401 -0.479 -1.226 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.010)*** 
Having two  -1.745 -1.804 -1.729 -1.802 -2.379 
 children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having three -1.921 -1.977 -1.782 -1.859 -2.331 
 children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having four or  -1.841 -1.943 -1.816 -1.929 -2.252 
 more children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Once having a  1.140 1.131 1.020 1.045 1.128 
 child died (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
New South Wales 0.603 0.615 0.656 0.666 0.618 
  (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.039)** (0.036)** (0.052)* 
Victoria 0.579 0.627 0.678 0.694 0.645 
 (0.027)** (0.020)** (0.032)** (0.028)** (0.042)** 
Queensland 0.596 0.664 0.746 0.767 0.696 
 (0.025)** (0.016)** (0.020)** (0.017)** (0.031)** 
South 0.688 0.716 0.805 0.818 0.747 
 Australia (0.012)** (0.012)** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.024)** 
Western  0.746 0.778 0.792 0.802 0.748 
 Australia (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.022)** 
Tasmania  0.522 0.583 0.651 0.693 0.569 
 (0.113) (0.083)* (0.085)* (0.067)* (0.134) 
North  0.787 0.860 0.505 0.539 0.522 
 Australia (0.069)* (0.051)* (0.353) (0.321) (0.337) 
Living in  0.055 0.170 0.292 0.311 0.398 
 major cities (0.805) (0.466) (0.268) (0.238) (0.133) 
Living in  0.064 0.186 0.312 0.330 0.395 
 inner regions (0.784) (0.446) (0.257) (0.231) (0.155) 
Living in  0.172 0.350 0.445 0.479 0.569 
 outer regions (0.481) (0.168) (0.125) (0.099)* (0.052)* 
Religiosity  0.036 0.032 0.033 0.032 
  (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
Attitude to  -0.012 0.002 0.007 0.010 
 paying job  (0.500) (0.924) (0.725) (0.631) 
Attitude to  0.044 0.041 0.039 0.036 
 motherhood  (0.015)** (0.043)** (0.052)* (0.072)* 
Equivalised   4.067e-06 4.118e-06 2.580e-06 
 household income   (0.013)** (0.012)** (0.134) 
Being employed    -0.200 -0.106 
    (0.062)* (0.337) 
Being unemployed    -0.313 -0.185 
    (0.220) (0.485) 
Legally married     0.195 
     (0.056)* 
In de facto      0.321 
 relationship     (0.003)*** 
Separated or      -0.172 
 divorced     (0.411) 
Age of oldest child     -0.065 
     (0.001)*** 
Age of youngest child     -0.923 
     (0.053)* 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant -0.464 -0.997 -1.358 -1.178 -1.191 
 (0.325) (0.049)** (0.020)** (0.046)** (0.045)** 
Observations 2463 2310 1760 1760 1760 
Pseudo R2 0.3638 0.3698 0.3682 0.3693 0.3778 
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Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Table A.4: Male expected fertility in the future  
Dependent variables: expected extra number of children in the future 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.256 0.246 0.183 0.177 0.125 
 (0.254) (0.311) (0.513) (0.531) (0.659) 
Bachelor 0.236 0.327 0.314 0.322 0.235 
 (0.212) (0.104) (0.183) (0.175) (0.324) 
Diploma 0.319 0.313 0.227 0.247 0.211 
 (0.151) (0.186) (0.397) (0.358) (0.435) 
Certificate 0.185 0.217 0.210 0.214 0.169 
 (0.289) (0.246) (0.339) (0.332) (0.445) 
Year 12 -0.038 -0.026 0.067 0.058 0.001 
 (0.852) (0.905) (0.790) (0.818) (0.996) 
Postgraduate *  -0.158 0.100 0.125 0.151 0.195 
 age group 30-34 (0.597) (0.755) (0.741) (0.691) (0.606) 
Postgraduate * 0.356 0.607 0.503 0.565 0.521 
 age group 35-39 (0.342) (0.131) (0.284) (0.230) (0.271) 
Postgraduate * 0.682 0.794 1.008 1.035 0.916 
 age group 40-44 (0.127) (0.084)* (0.042)** (0.038)** (0.069)* 
Bachelor * -0.140 -0.052 -0.050 -0.045 0.041 
 age group 30-34 (0.563) (0.843) (0.868) (0.882) (0.894) 
Bachelor * 0.526 0.594 0.706 0.747 0.816 
 age group 35-39 (0.098)* (0.085)* (0.072)* (0.057)* (0.039)** 
Bachelor * -0.015 -0.073 -0.056 -0.020 -0.138 
 age group 40-44 (0.977) (0.886) (0.918) (0.971) (0.802) 
Diploma * -0.088 0.122 0.119 0.109 0.178 
age group 30-34 (0.765) (0.696) (0.737) (0.758) (0.617) 
Diploma * 0.419 0.612 0.756 0.808 0.945 
 age group 35-39 (0.257) (0.123) (0.094)* (0.074)* (0.038)** 
Diploma * 0.485 0.417 0.601 0.593 0.534 
 age group 40-44 (0.325) (0.415) (0.289) (0.296) (0.349) 
Certificate * -0.082 -0.036 0.100 0.103 0.112 
 age group 30-34 (0.720) (0.885) (0.726) (0.719) (0.694) 
Certificate * 0.282 0.304 0.384 0.432 0.490 
 age group 35-39 (0.348) (0.357) (0.308) (0.253) (0.196) 
Certificate * 0.015 -0.204 -0.337 -0.302 -0.320 
 age group 40-44 (0.971) (0.637) (0.479) (0.527) (0.503) 
year 12 * 0.269 0.438 0.428 0.453 0.460 
age group 30-34 (0.319) (0.133) (0.192) (0.168) (0.161) 
year 12 * 0.051 0.297 -0.217 -0.185 -0.237 
 age group 35-39 (0.905) (0.511) (0.708) (0.750) (0.684) 
year 12 * 0.952 0.973 1.034 1.100 1.030 
 age group 40-44 (0.049)** (0.048)** (0.047)** (0.035)** (0.049)** 
Age of finishing  0.035 0.031 0.026 0.022 0.022 
 full-time education (0.012)** (0.037)** (0.124) (0.194) (0.183) 
Attended  -0.241 -0.156 -0.053 -0.049 -0.028 
 government schools (0.000)*** (0.024)** (0.500) (0.533) (0.723) 
Number of  0.024 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.008 
 siblings (0.146) (0.517) (0.538) (0.467) (0.709) 
Being oldest child -0.032 -0.015 0.003 0.006 0.020 
 in the family (0.618) (0.818) (0.967) (0.943) (0.794) 
Born in high- 0.309 0.101 0.242 0.240 0.288 
 fertility countries (0.014)** (0.479) (0.146) (0.149) (0.089)* 
Born in medium- 0.270 0.261 0.093 0.076 0.007 
 fertility countries (0.049)** (0.083)* (0.610) (0.679) (0.971) 
Born in low- 0.337 0.389 0.287 0.274 0.275 
 fertility countries (0.032)** (0.018)** (0.133) (0.153) (0.150) 
Years since  -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
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 immigration (0.218) (0.186) (0.388) (0.422) (0.498) 
Having one child -0.368 -0.400 -0.389 -0.378 -1.287 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having two  -1.526 -1.566 -1.546 -1.537 -2.361 
 children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having three -1.868 -1.951 -1.883 -1.876 -2.640 
 children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Having four or  -1.359 -1.383 -1.307 -1.311 -2.106 
 more children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Once having a  0.767 0.874 0.605 0.610 0.283 
 child died (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.114) (0.111) (0.511) 
New South Wales 0.333 0.268 0.452 0.450 0.508 
  (0.165) (0.268) (0.151) (0.152) (0.107) 
Victoria 0.483 0.453 0.589 0.597 0.623 
 (0.043)** (0.060)* (0.060)* (0.056)* (0.047)** 
Queensland 0.480 0.452 0.651 0.648 0.689 
 (0.048)** (0.065)* (0.040)** (0.041)** (0.030)** 
South Australia 0.538 0.459 0.735 0.727 0.736 
  (0.032)** (0.070)* (0.023)** (0.025)** (0.023)** 
Western Australia 0.498 0.496 0.620 0.616 0.672 
  (0.045)** (0.047)** (0.053)* (0.055)* (0.036)** 
Tasmania  0.475 0.515 0.665 0.675 0.677 
 (0.117) (0.092)* (0.071)* (0.066)* (0.066)* 
North Australia 0.313 0.039 0.226 0.230 0.237 
  (0.500) (0.941) (0.691) (0.687) (0.678) 
Living in  0.625 0.521 0.569 0.562 0.619 
 major cities (0.030)** (0.072)* (0.088)* (0.092)* (0.062)* 
Living in  0.667 0.548 0.624 0.612 0.639 
 inner regions (0.024)** (0.064)* (0.067)* (0.073)* (0.060)* 
Living in  0.444 0.440 0.453 0.437 0.487 
 outer regions (0.143) (0.151) (0.200) (0.216) (0.169) 
Religiosity  0.040 0.041 0.039 0.044 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Attitude to  0.001 0.010 0.010 0.017 
 paying job  (0.961) (0.635) (0.617) (0.405) 
Attitude to  0.062 0.058 0.061 0.073 
 motherhood  (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** 
Equivalised   1.710e-06 1.911e-06 3.143e-06 
 household income   (0.130) (0.094)* (0.014)** 
Being employed    -0.296 -0.379 
    (0.056)* (0.016)** 
Being unemployed    -0.447 -0.447 
    (0.054)* (0.058)* 
Legally married     0.360 
     (0.000)*** 
In de facto      0.458 
 relationship     (0.000)*** 
Separated or      -0.629 
 divorced     (0.019)** 
Age of oldest child     -0.015 
     (0.293) 
Age of youngest child     -0.839 
     (0.000)*** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant -1.364 -1.691 -1.988 -1.667 -2.020 
 (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** 
Observations 2084 1943 1536 1536 1536 
Pseudo R2 0.2715 0.2764 0.2723 0.2736 0.2887 
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Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.      
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Table A.5: Female expected extra number of children in the future (POISSON) 
 
Dependent variables: expected extra number of children in the future 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline model First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.153 0.277 0.288 0.307 0.336 
 (0.372) (0.118) (0.144) (0.120) (0.088)* 
Bachelor 0.210 0.295 0.305 0.319 0.326 
 (0.138) (0.044)** (0.058)* (0.048)** (0.042)** 
Diploma 0.122 0.170 0.174 0.191 0.196 
 (0.403) (0.256) (0.287) (0.243) (0.230) 
Certificate 0.080 0.107 0.142 0.143 0.137 
 (0.530) (0.411) (0.319) (0.317) (0.337) 
Year 12 0.352 0.417 0.415 0.428 0.432 
 (0.007)*** (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Schooling * 0.078 0.061 0.031 0.031 0.004 
 having one child (0.020)** (0.077)* (0.410) (0.413) (0.925) 
Schooling * 0.188 0.156 0.071 0.079 0.067 
 having 2 children (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.280) (0.230) (0.306) 
Schooling * 0.072 0.040 0.034 0.045 0.006 
 having 3 children (0.375) (0.632) (0.714) (0.634) (0.952) 
Schooling * 0.028 0.038 0.007 0.015 -0.023 
 having 4+ children (0.782) (0.713) (0.956) (0.909) (0.850) 
age of finishing full-time 
education 
0.023 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.016 
 (0.170) (0.120) (0.167) (0.208) (0.410) 
Attended government -0.198 -0.192 -0.160 -0.152 -0.182 
 schools (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.041)** (0.054)* (0.021)** 
Number of siblings -0.005 -0.014 -0.021 -0.025 -0.017 
 (0.786) (0.504) (0.365) (0.271) (0.471) 
Being oldest child -0.090 -0.096 -0.111 -0.119 -0.105 
 in the family (0.186) (0.172) (0.152) (0.125) (0.180) 
Born in high- 0.109 -0.084 0.148 0.136 0.166 
 fertility countries (0.456) (0.603) (0.414) (0.453) (0.366) 
Born in medium- -0.196 -0.297 -0.108 -0.107 -0.132 
 fertility countries (0.209) (0.074)* (0.580) (0.585) (0.501) 
Born in low- 0.126 0.050 0.114 0.105 0.084 
 fertility countries (0.428) (0.773) (0.553) (0.585) (0.668) 
Years since  -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 immigration (0.257) (0.424) (0.211) (0.219) (0.215) 
Having one child -1.458 -1.252 -0.804 -0.871 -1.259 
 (0.002)*** (0.010)*** (0.130) (0.101) (0.056)* 
Having two  -4.241 -3.864 -2.636 -2.811 -3.222 
 children (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Having three -2.767 -2.391 -2.109 -2.308 -2.426 
 children (0.009)*** (0.028)** (0.083)* (0.060)* (0.091)* 
Having four or  -1.940 -2.125 -1.689 -1.891 -1.989 
 more children (0.117) (0.097)* (0.271) (0.220) (0.200) 
New South Wales 0.617 0.630 0.674 0.683 0.622 
  (0.018)** (0.020)** (0.033)** (0.031)** (0.049)** 
Victoria 0.604 0.653 0.693 0.707 0.629 
 (0.020)** (0.015)** (0.027)** (0.024)** (0.045)** 
Queensland 0.602 0.667 0.751 0.769 0.682 
 (0.023)** (0.015)** (0.019)** (0.016)** (0.033)** 
South Australia 0.688 0.719 0.806 0.820 0.726 
  (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.014)** (0.013)** (0.028)** 
Western Australia 0.754 0.782 0.793 0.804 0.746 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.022)** 
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Tasmania  0.563 0.622 0.685 0.726 0.567 
 (0.086)* (0.064)* (0.068)* (0.053)* (0.132) 
North Australia 0.769 0.816 0.508 0.541 0.531 
  (0.075)* (0.063)* (0.347) (0.317) (0.327) 
Living in  0.047 0.157 0.288 0.305 0.384 
 major cities (0.835) (0.500) (0.274) (0.248) (0.148) 
Living in  0.058 0.174 0.323 0.340 0.404 
 inner regions (0.802) (0.474) (0.240) (0.218) (0.146) 
Living in  0.143 0.329 0.456 0.483 0.579 
 outer regions (0.558) (0.195) (0.115) (0.096)* (0.048)** 
Religiosity  0.034 0.032 0.033 0.032 
  (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Attitude to  -0.006 0.009 0.014 0.012 
 paying job  (0.729) (0.654) (0.493) (0.531) 
Attitude to  0.040 0.042 0.040 0.038 
 motherhood  (0.026)** (0.037)** (0.045)** (0.056)* 
Equivalised   4.268e-06 4.421e-06 2.778e-06 
 household income   (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.105) 
Being employed    -0.190 -0.096 
    (0.075)* (0.385) 
Being unemployed    -0.192 -0.109 
    (0.449) (0.676) 
Legally married     0.178 
     (0.082)* 
In de facto      0.315 
 relationship     (0.003)*** 
Separated or      -0.167 
 divorced     (0.424) 
Ever had a child      1.131 
 Died     (0.000)*** 
Age of oldest child     -0.069 
     (0.001)*** 
Age of youngest      -0.930 
 child     (0.029)** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant -0.450 -0.998 -1.432 -1.274 -1.311 
 (0.332) (0.046)** (0.012)** (0.028)** (0.025)** 
Observations  2462 2310 1760 1760 1760 
Pseudo R2 0.3575 0.3628 0.3610 0.3619 0.3744 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Table A.6: Male expected extra number of children in the future (POISSON) 
 
Dependent variables: expected extra number of children in the future 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Baseline 
model 
First 
extension 
Second 
extension 
Third 
extension 
Fourth 
extension 
Postgraduate 0.322 0.493 0.424 0.428 0.390 
 (0.040)** (0.004)*** (0.034)** (0.033)** (0.051)* 
Bachelor 0.281 0.435 0.424 0.435 0.392 
 (0.034)** (0.003)*** (0.012)** (0.011)** (0.021)** 
Diploma 0.410 0.534 0.465 0.482 0.492 
 (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** 
Certificate 0.225 0.289 0.332 0.343 0.322 
 (0.039)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.013)** (0.019)** 
Year 12 0.183 0.300 0.376 0.384 0.334 
 (0.158) (0.032)** (0.017)** (0.016)** (0.035)** 
Schooling * 0.043 0.041 0.057 0.058 0.050 
 having one child (0.198) (0.246) (0.153) (0.143) (0.209) 
Schooling * -0.022 -0.018 0.001 0.002 -0.002 
 having 2 children (0.664) (0.736) (0.981) (0.977) (0.969) 
Schooling * -0.093 -0.123 -0.154 -0.149 -0.163 
 having 3 children (0.340) (0.225) (0.172) (0.188) (0.142) 
Schooling * -0.149 -0.201 -0.242 -0.231 -0.255 
 having 4+ children (0.164) (0.068)* (0.045)** (0.055)* (0.043)** 
age of finishing full-time 
education 
0.032 0.030 0.025 0.023 0.023 
 (0.019)** (0.035)** (0.118) (0.158) (0.146) 
Attended government -0.255 -0.171 -0.077 -0.073 -0.047 
 schools (0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.325) (0.348) (0.548) 
Number of siblings 0.028 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.017 
 (0.082)* (0.308) (0.306) (0.247) (0.409) 
Being oldest child -0.017 -0.009 0.013 0.017 0.029 
 in the family (0.783) (0.891) (0.859) (0.822) (0.707) 
Born in high- 0.304 0.073 0.211 0.212 0.264 
 fertility countries (0.014)** (0.600) (0.192) (0.193) (0.112) 
Born in medium- 0.288 0.271 0.131 0.120 0.044 
 fertility countries (0.034)** (0.069)* (0.470) (0.508) (0.810) 
Born in low- 0.353 0.369 0.288 0.277 0.278 
 fertility countries (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.130) (0.148) (0.143) 
Years since  -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
 immigration (0.182) (0.202) (0.332) (0.356) (0.443) 
Having one child -0.936 -0.959 -1.156 -1.170 -1.924 
 (0.041)** (0.054)* (0.036)** (0.034)** (0.001)*** 
Having two  -1.214 -1.310 -1.528 -1.524 -2.228 
 children (0.073)* (0.065)* (0.052)* (0.053)* (0.006)*** 
Having three -0.641 -0.340 0.123 0.060 -0.478 
 children (0.604) (0.791) (0.931) (0.966) (0.736) 
Having four or  0.594 1.251 1.808 1.663 1.241 
 more children (0.653) (0.359) (0.221) (0.260) (0.421) 
New South Wales 0.326 0.254 0.437 0.443 0.493 
  (0.175) (0.295) (0.163) (0.158) (0.116) 
Victoria 0.475 0.445 0.590 0.603 0.626 
 (0.047)** (0.064)* (0.059)* (0.053)* (0.045)** 
Queensland 0.470 0.425 0.625 0.630 0.677 
 (0.053)* (0.082)* (0.048)** (0.046)** (0.033)** 
South Australia 0.540 0.459 0.736 0.735 0.754 
  (0.031)** (0.070)* (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.020)** 
Western Australia 0.486 0.466 0.597 0.600 0.660 
  (0.050)* (0.063)* (0.062)* (0.061)* (0.039)** 
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Tasmania  0.415 0.436 0.584 0.593 0.566 
 (0.168) (0.150) (0.110) (0.105) (0.123) 
North Australia 0.338 0.062 0.266 0.272 0.267 
  (0.466) (0.907) (0.641) (0.632) (0.639) 
Living in  0.670 0.564 0.650 0.643 0.709 
 major cities (0.021)** (0.053)* (0.052)* (0.054)* (0.032)** 
Living in  0.718 0.605 0.705 0.696 0.736 
 inner regions (0.015)** (0.041)** (0.038)** (0.041)** (0.029)** 
Living in  0.480 0.490 0.528 0.515 0.569 
 outer regions (0.114) (0.110) (0.134) (0.144) (0.106) 
Religiosity  0.040 0.041 0.039 0.044 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Attitude to  0.003 0.012 0.013 0.018 
 paying job  (0.856) (0.547) (0.531) (0.369) 
Attitude to  0.060 0.057 0.059 0.072 
 motherhood  (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** 
Equivalised   2.016e-06 2.188e-06 3.557e-06 
 household income   (0.063)* (0.046)** (0.004)*** 
Being employed    -0.242 -0.341 
    (0.116) (0.028)** 
Being unemployed    -0.391 -0.398 
    (0.089)* (0.088)* 
Legally married     0.356 
     (0.000)*** 
In de facto      0.473 
 relationship     (0.000)*** 
Separated or      -0.634 
 divorced     (0.018)** 
Ever had a child died     0.308 
     (0.471) 
Age of oldest child     -0.025 
     (0.081)* 
Age of youngest child     -0.821 
     (0.001)*** 
Age dummies … … … … … 
Constant -1.428 -1.851 -2.217 -1.992 -2.371 
 (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Observations 2084 1943 1536 1536 1536 
Pseudo R2 0.2672 0.2719 0.2659 0.2669 0.2831 
Notes: (i) P values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
 (ii) Age dummies were included in all the models.     
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Table A.7: Breakdown of key characteristics of female by education levels 
 
Characteristics Postgraduate Bachelor Diploma Certificate Year 12 Year 11 or 
below 
Intended lifetime fertility 1.83 (1.28) 1.94 (1.18) 2.00 (1.26) 2.24 (1.26) 2.17 (1.32) 2.43 (1.35) 
Children ever had 1.23 (1.29) 1.14 (1.27) 1.48 (1.36) 1.86 (1.37) 1.61 (1.41) 2.24 (1.40) 
Expected children in the 
future 
0.60 (0.95) 0.79 (1.04) 0.52 (0.91) 0.37 (0.79) 0.56 (1.02) 0.19 (0.59) 
Lifetime childless 22.03%  16.59% 15.77% 10.79% 12.97% 8.82% 
Ever had a child died 1.27% 1.57% 2.87% 3.22% 3.17% 4.48% 
Ever had a child died 
among people having ever 
had children 
2.14% 2.86% 4.30% 4.08% 4.45% 5.13% 
Legally married 64.41% 57.85% 56.99% 62.80% 59.94% 60.84% 
In de facto relationship 11.02% 14.57% 14.34% 13.37% 13.83% 14.50% 
Separated /divorced 7.2% 6.28% 10.04% 11.59% 8.65% 12.26% 
Single 17.37% 21.30% 18.64% 12.24% 17.29% 12.41% 
Religiosity (0-10) 4.67 (3.54) 4.76 (3.46) 4.41 (3.53) 4.59 (3.46) 4.63 (3.56) 4.27 (3.49) 
Attitude to job (1-7) 4.52 (1.98) 4.51 (1.87) 4.64 (1.99) 4.79 (1.84) 4.61 (1.96) 4.94 (2.00) 
Attitude to motherhood (1-
7) 
4.88 (1.99) 4.97 (2.00) 5.54 (1.81) 5.96 (1.56) 5.60 (1.69) 6.22 (1.46) 
Never married 25.85% 34.08% 29.75% 21.26% 25.43% 22.57% 
Married two or more times 3.81% 5.61% 8.24% 9.66% 7.23% 9.72% 
Number of siblings 2.59 (1.65) 2.47 (1.63) 2.71 (2.19) 2.95 (2.06) 2.91 (2.11) 3.40 (2.35) 
Equivalised household 
income 
48595.01 
(28467.22) 
44577.84 
(26710.96) 
38007.27 
(25951.06) 
29541.3 
(19905.14) 
31741.74 
(19851.9) 
23594.09 
(15922.21) 
Proportion of employed 
years after full-time 
education 
79% (0.20) 77% (0.23) 78% (0.22) 72% (0.25) 73% (0.28) 60% (0.32) 
Proportion of unemployed 
years after full-time 
education 
1.4% (.043) 1.6%     
(.045) 
2.6% 
(0.066) 
3.6% 
(0.094) 
2.6%  
(0.074) 
4.1% 
(0.112) 
Employed 85.17% 80.72% 73.48% 67.63% 70.03% 52.47% 
Unemployed 2.12% 2.24% 2.15% 3.38% 1.73% 4.63% 
NLF 12.71% 17.04% 24.37% 28.99% 28.24% 42.90% 
Born in Australia 75.42% 72.65% 78.49% 79.07% 72.33% 82.81% 
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Table A.8: Breakdown of key characteristics of male by education levels 
 
Characteristics Postgraduate Bachelor Diploma Certificate Year 12 Year 11 or 
below 
Intended lifetime fertility 1.85 (1.25) 2.00(1.21) 2.13 (1.44) 2.04 (1.38) 1.70 (1.27) 1.98 (1.49) 
Children ever had 1.22 (1.27) 1.10 (1.24) 1.48 (1.37) 1.50 (1.40) 0.96 (1.17) 1.63 (1.42) 
Expected children in the 
future 
0.73 (1.07) 0.96 (1.23) 0.69 (0.98) 0.54 (1.02) 0.74 (1.04) 0.35 (0.84) 
Lifetime childless 18.75% 16.23%  13.27% 16.51% 27.70% 21.06% 
Ever had a child died 1.04% 1.16% 1.53% 2.00% 1.41% 2.22% 
Ever had a child died 
among people having ever 
had children 
1.79% 2.29% 2.40% 3.04% 2.91% 3.14% 
Legally married 63.02% 58.26% 56.63% 59.55% 50.23% 52.11% 
In de facto relationship 14.06% 13.91% 12.76% 14.27% 15.49% 17.74% 
Separated /divorced 4.69% 4.64% 8.16% 7.67% 2.82% 6.87% 
Single 18.23% 23.19% 22.45% 18.51% 31.46% 23.28% 
Religiosity (0-10) 3.88 (3.61) 4.03 (3.50) 3.82 (3.49) 3.45 (3.32) 3.49 (3.15) 3.23 (3.47) 
Attitude to job (1-7) 4.90 (1.84) 4.87 (1.79) 5.09 (1.75) 5.40 (1.71) 5.26 (1.78) 5.62 (1.74) 
Attitude to motherhood (1-
7) 
4.76 (1.88) 4.78 (1.88) 4.85 (1.84) 5.53 (1.67) 5.15 (1.84) 5.70 (1.72) 
Never married 30.21% 35.07% 32.14% 30.07% 44.13% 36.59% 
Married two or more times 3.13% 4.64% 8.16% 4.83% 4.23% 8.65% 
Number of siblings 2.36 (1.47) 2.54 (1.99) 2.6 (1.91) 2.86 (2.01) 2.69 (2.15) 3.25 (2.33) 
Equivalised household 
income 
54352.17 
(50479.32) 
48966.91 
(26024.1) 
41884.78 
(29409.49) 
32998.33 
(20641.77) 
38582.85 
(22855.28) 
27547.53 
(19319.7) 
Proportion of employed 
years after full-time 
education 
81% (0.23) 83% (0.20) 89% (0.16) 91% (0.15) 89% (0.19) 86% (0.20) 
Proportion of unemployed 
years after full-time 
education 
2%  
(0.050) 
1.5%     
(0.046) 
3.1% 
(0.062) 
5%  
(0.117) 
5.6%  
(0.130) 
8.4% 
(0.135) 
Employed 91.67% 93.91% 92.35% 90.80% 90.61% 78.94% 
Unemployed 1.56% 2.32% 3.06% 4.48% 3.76% 9.53% 
NLF 6.77% 3.77% 4.59% 4.72% 5.63% 11.53% 
Born in Australia 61.98% 70.72% 78.57% 84.43% 75.59% 80.49% 
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